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INTRODUCTION
Few political institutions play as palpable, ubiquitous, and
solemn a role in the U.S. public life as the criminal justice system. The
task of determining the defendant's criminal liability with a high
degree of certitude is performed through the ritualized and highly
proceduralized adjudicative process, with the trial at its core. The
United States Supreme Court has portrayed the criminal trial as a
"decisive and portentous"1  and "paramount" event. 2 Trials are
considered "the central institution of law as we know it,"3 the "crown
jewel" of the legal system. 4 Amidst its multiple purposes, an essential
objective of the criminal trial is to determine facts: which human
events constitute crimes and who perpetrated them. Specifically, the
trial is designed to serve the diagnostic function of distinguishing
between prosecutions of guilty and innocent people, or at least
between compelling prosecutions and those that do not meet the
requisite certitude.
The prevailing sentiment within the American polity and legal
profession is that the trial is indeed acutely diagnostic.5 Naturally, the
potential for accurate criminal verdicts depends on the ability of the
factfinders-typically juries-to ascertain the facts accurately. The
Supreme Court routinely lauds the process's factfinding capabilities.
1. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
2. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993).
3. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 3 (2009); JAMES BOYD WHITE,
FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 108 (1999).
4. Randall T. Shepard, The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court Reform,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1535, 1543 (2006).
5. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 5 (1994) (noting that although "juries [do not] always get their verdicts right... [t]o
get at the good, we must risk the bad"); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 153 (1999)
(noting that "[tihe work of juries is generally highly regarded by those in a position to know");
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 346 (2007) ("After evaluating
all of the evidence, our verdict is strongly in favor of the American jury.").
For early exceptions to the mainstream view, see EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT 367 (1932) (noting that the errors that lead to false convictions are "typical"); JEROME
FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY 31 (1957) ("The conviction and imprisonment of innocent
men too frequently occur to be ignored by any of us. There are too many cases on record to prove
the point, and there may be countless others of which we know nothing.").
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Even for the toughest of factual questions, the Court is "content to rely
upon the good sense and judgment of American juries.
'6
This Article seeks to answer a simple question: How good are
factfinders in determining facts? In other words, how well does the
criminal trial serve its diagnostic function of distinguishing between
factual guilt and innocence? The need to examine this question is
increasing with the mounting revelations of false convictions.
7
Although the dust has yet to settle, the newfound cognizance of the
system's capacity to err is beginning to make some cracks in the
prevailing view of the criminal justice process.
8
One of the most distinctive features of the criminal justice
process is that it is operationalized predominantly through people:
witnesses, detectives, prosecutors, suspects, defense attorneys,
forensic examiners, judges, and jurors. These actors turn the wheels of
the system through their mental operations: perceptions, memories,
recognitions, assessments, inferences, judgments, and decisions-all
tied in with emotions, affective states, motivations, role perceptions,
and institutional commitments. As the process can perform no better
than the mental performance of the people involved, it seems sensible
to examine its workings from a psychological perspective. Fortunately,
a very large body of germane experimental psychological research is
available. For some decades now, legal-psychologists have been
earnestly studying people's performances in fulfilling their designated
roles in the operation of the criminal justice process. Likewise, basic-
psychologists-notably cognitive-psychologists, social-psychologists,
and decisionmaking researchers-have been studying a wide range of
mental processing that is implicated in the workings of the criminal
justice process.
6. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, (1977). It should be noted that informal
factfinding is performed at other times by other actors, including prosecutors, judges, and even
defense attorneys.
7. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go
WRONG (forthcoming Apr. 2011); THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED: Too MANY
WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 1 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocence
Project 250.pdf; Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523,523-24 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Reasonable Doubt Seriously, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
63, 66 (2010) (noting that "a generation ago, most of the citizenry truly believed that innocent
people were rarely, if ever, convicted" while today "the citizenry must be far less at ease'). See
generally Symposium, Convicting the Innocent, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2008).
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This Article focuses on the performance of factfinders. 9 Part I
examines people's ability to perform the central factfinding task: the
drawing of correct inferences from the types of human testimony that
are typically presented in criminal trials. This examination covers
people's ability to determine whether a witness's identification of the
perpetrator is correct, whether her memories of the event are
accurate, whether the defendant's confession offers a truthful account
of her deeds, whether a proposed alibi is true, and whether a witness
is lying or telling the truth. This Part goes on to examine two systemic
factors that cloud the task of deciphering evidence: false corroboration
and the paucity of the investigative record. Part II examines non-
evidential aspects of the task that have the potential to further hinder
and bias the decisionmaking process. This examination looks at the
courtroom environment, notably at various forms of persuasion and
the arousal of emotion. It also examines the effects of exposure to
impermissible information, racial prejudice, and the possible bias
borne by the decisionmaker's cognitive process itself, namely, the
coherence effect.
The psychological research indicates that the cognitive
processing involved in discovering the truth in difficult cases is more
complex and fickle than generally believed. The determination of facts
is influenced by a variety of factors, some of which are well known in
the legal literature, while others are unknown, under-appreciated,
and, at times, counterintuitive. Accurate determinations require high
levels of attentiveness, meticulousness, and commitment to reaching
the truth, which are often absent from the hard-hitting practices of
the adversarial process. As a result, factual findings are bound to
contain an appreciable level of inaccuracy, and are also vulnerable to
manipulation. While faulty factual determinations lead mostly to the
prosecution of innocent people, they can also result in dropped charges
against truly guilty people and even in wrongful acquittals. The
prospect of error is generally ignored or denied by those entrusted
with governing the criminal justice system, and is not adequately
recognized in the scholarly debate.
In sum, I argue that in difficult and contested criminal cases,
the adjudicative process falls short of delivering the level of
diagnosticity that befits its epistemic demands and the certitude that
it proclaims. A primary purpose of this Article is to critically examine
9. For discussions of other actors throughout the criminal justice process, see DAN SIMON,
IN DOUBT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (forthcoming;
tentative title).
[Vol. 64:1:143146
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the predominant view of the adjudicative process, namely, the
sanguine trust in its ability to accurately determine factual truth.10
Second, the Article is intended to enrich the legal debate with
germane, yet mostly unfamiliar, knowledge gleaned from
psychological research. Third, the piece examines possible avenues for
reform. Although some of the constraints on the process's diagnosticity
are rather impervious to modification, there is room for progress.
Diagnosticity can be enhanced by limiting the admissibility of
unreliable evidence, increasing the use of expert witnesses, and
instructing jurors to refrain from relying on unreliable cues, especially
the witnesses' demeanor. More importantly, the adjudicative process
stands to benefit from enhancing the integrity of the evidence from
which verdicts are made. This can be achieved foremost by making the
investigatory process transparent to the factfinders. Any prospects of
reform are contingent on a reassertion of the value of factual accuracy
as its predominant desideratum and a frank acknowledgment of the
limited diagnosticity of the process.
Some caveats and clarifications are in order. The following
discussion applies only weakly to the large category of cases that, from
a forensic perspective, can be considered easy ones. Studies of police
investigations show that, in the majority of the cases that are cleared,
the identity of the perpetrator and the important details of the crime
were never in doubt." While this class of cases yields a large majority
of the prison population, it accounts for but a small fraction of the
adjudicative procedures. These cases tend to be disposed through plea
bargaining, by which more than ninety percent of felony convictions
are obtained.' 2 The few such cases that do go to trial tend not to tax
the adjudicatory process. This Article pertains primarily to the class of
difficult cases, in which the evidence is more complex, less obvious,
and relies heavily on human testimony. These are the cases that
10. For an early critique, see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 16 (1949) (noting that that there can be "no assurance" that facts as adduced
by a trial court will coincide with the "actual, past facts').
11. The well-known RAND study on police investigations concludes that a majority of the
serious crimes that get cleared are solved by the time the crime is first reported to the
responding patrolman. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS
VOLUME III: OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 66 (1975). Likewise, in the United Kingdom, it has
been estimated that some seventy percent of homicide cases can be considered "self-solvers."
Martin Innes, The 'Trocess Structures" of Police Homicide Investigations, 42 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 669, 672 (2002).
12. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY




consume most of the adjudicative resources. These are also the cases
that put the diagnostic capabilities of the trial to the test.
The following discussion focuses almost exclusively on
determinations of facts that are, at least in principle, discernable-
notably, the identity of the perpetrator and the physical acts and
circumstances of the criminal event. This Article has little to say
about value judgments that factfinders are called to make, such as the
reasonableness of an act, the morality of a behavior, or the fairness of
the law, The Article will focus mostly on the performance of lay people,
who serve the factfinding function in the large majority of criminal
trials. Its purpose, however, is not to question the suitability of juries
for the task, nor to compare them to judges. A mounting body of
studies finds that judges do not perform much differently than lay
people in many factfinding tasks. 13 The limitations of human cognition
observed in the research appear to exceed any possible differences
between the two decisionmaking entities. The suitability of the jury as
the preferred factfinding body is left for another day. Finally, the
Article focuses on decisions made by actors who honestly believe that
they are fulfilling their roles properly. Deliberate dishonest conduct
raises different sets of issues, which lie beyond the scope of this
project.
Applying experimental research to any practical context raises
concerns over the external-validity of the research, that is, the
appropriateness of generalizing laboratory findings to the real world.
Indeed, legal psychological research has been criticized on these
grounds. 14 This concern places a serious burden on researchers'
13. For example, federal magistrate judges did not perform better than lay subjects in tasks
involving anchoring effects, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias, but did perform better in tasks
involving framing effects and the representativeness heuristic. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 826-27
(2001). Bankruptcy judges were found to be susceptible to anchoring and framing effects, but
appeared uninfluenced by the omission bias and some emotional factors. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227,
1256-57 (2006). On the Cognitive Reflection Task, which tests people's ability to override
erroneous intuitive judgments, judges performed better than undergraduate students from some
colleges, but poorer than students from four elite universities. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2007). Amongst other findings, judges performed rather poorly at ignoring
evidence which they themselves determined was inadmissible.
14. See, e.g., Vladimir J. Kone~ni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Courtroom Testimony by
Psychologists on Eyewitness Identification Issues: Critical Notes and Reflections, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 117, 121 (1986) (noting that "[vlirtually none of [psychologists'] simulations have been
validated in terms of the real-world situations . . . either in general, or in reference to a
particular trial, defendant, and crime" (citation omitted)); Michael McCloskey et al., The
[Vol. 64:1:143
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shoulders. It does not, however, warrant an unreflective dismissal of
the research. 15 Though imperfect, the psychological research offers a
wealth of sorely needed insight into the workings of the criminal
justice system.
The Article should not be taken to stand for the proposition
that the legal system is entirely insensitive to the psychological
aspects involved in the production of criminal verdicts. The legal
process contains a considerable amount of psychological intuitions.
16
Still, the law's psychological sensibilities are often limited and
inaccurate, and are frozen at the pre-experimental state of knowledge
that prevailed at the time these common law rules were forged. There
is good reason to update the legal system with more reliable and
nuanced knowledge of human behavior.
I. DECIPHERING THE TESTIMONY
This Part examines people's ability to draw inferences from
types of evidence that are typical of criminal trials. The focus is on
human testimony, which is an essential ingredient in almost every
trial. The discussion examines situations where the factfinder does not
have verifiable information that originates from external sources, such
as a DNA match or surveillance camera footage. The task, then, is to
Experimental Psychologist in Court: The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2
(1986) ('The need to examine the ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists is
underscored by the fact that this sort of expert testimony is rapidly increasing in frequency.").
15. Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 88 (1999); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from
Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561, 567 (1997). The response to this concern lies in
the power of convergent validity, that is, the combined empirical support derived from
replicating the results, testing different stimuli on different populations and in different
laboratories, and focusing on different facets of the issues. The research is validated also by
triangulating a variety of methodologies, including basic and legal psychological
experimentation, survey data, field studies, and archival research. To be sure, not every finding
mentioned in this Article has been subjected to the complete panoply of external-validity
verification, though the available data indicate that the findings are typically consistent and
resilient. Undoubtedly, some of the findings will be altered by future research. See Dan Simon,
In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the Psychology of Judging, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 131, 143 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds.,
2010) (discussing the application of experimentation to judicial decisionmaking).
16. For example, the legal regime manifests a certain awareness of the possible effects of
leading questions, biased identification lineups, and coercion in the interrogation room. A
psychological sensibility also underlies the limitations on admissibility of prejudicial evidence,
bad character, and criminal record. See FED. R. EvID. 403-04; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 742
(Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006) ("[Jlurors may regard personality traits as more
predictive of individual behavior than they actually are ... ").
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draw correct inferences directly from the witnesses' testimony itself.
An overarching objective of the adjudicatory process is to ensure that
the inferences drawn comport generally to a standard of rationality.
17
Three preliminary issues are worthy of note. Foremost, it is
crucial to acknowledge that the factfinder does not have at her
disposal the witnesses' unadulterated account of the events, which I
will call raw evidence. For one, courtroom testimony is usually
proffered months, sometimes years, following the criminal event.'
8
Moreover, the investigation itself can induce erroneous testimony. 19
Over the course of the investigation and preparation for the
adversarial contest, the evidence often undergoes editing,
17. The dominant standard is encapsulated in what William Twining has labeled the
"rationalist tradition of adjudication." E.g., WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 32-91 (1990). This tradition dates back to Bentham and can be traced
through the writings of James Fitzjames Stephen, James Bradley Thayer, John Wigmore, and
Lon Fuller. Fuller described adjudication as "a device which gives formal and institutional
expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs. As such it assumes a burden
of rationality not borne by any other form of social ordering." Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366 (1978). This theme is echoed by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (noting that the presumption of
innocence "cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the
arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal
evidence adduced"). A model of adjudication based on the "rationalist tradition" does not imply
that jurors employ formal mathematical models, such as Bayes's Theorem, in evaluating
evidence. Rather, it assumes that the process is performed in a generally rational manner and
free of systematic biases. See Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Processes, in
INSIDE THE JUROR 84, 86 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) ("The juror arrives at a degree of belief that the
defendant is guilty based on the implications of relevant information ... ").
18. Based on data from the seventy-five largest counties in the nation, the median time
from arrest to adjudication for various felonies, including rape, robbery and, assault, is in the
range of four to six months, and just over a year for murder. Invariably, the periods are
considerably longer in the cases that actually go to trial. TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H.
COHEN, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004 - STATISTICAL
TABLES tbl. 18 (2008), available at http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/htmlfdluc
/2004/fdlucO4st.pdf.
19. As discussed in detail elsewhere, the evidence produced by the investigation is not an
unadulterated reproduction of reality and oftentimes is not even a faithful reproduction of the
witnesses' original accounts. Police investigations are effectively conducted in a quasi-
adversarial manner, at least after the suspect has been identified and often placed under arrest.
Detectives are prone to engage in hypothesis-confirming search strategies, expose themselves
mostly to confirmatory information, scrutinize the facts in a selective manner, and selectively
determine the stopping point of the inquiry. Importantly, the research shows that witnesses are
sensitive to a host of inducing behaviors, which usually results in testimony that conforms to the
investigators' beliefs and their quasi-adversarial motivations. See SIMON, supra note 9, chs. 2-5;
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 314-16 (discussing the effect of confirmation bias on criminal
investigations); D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosenthal,
The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) (same).
150
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embellishment, and alteration.20 Thus, by the time the memorial
account is presented at trial, it has both decayed and been subjected to
conditions that are conducive to contamination. The transformation of
evidence also guts some of the traces of accuracy that occasionally
accompany the testimony. Determining the facts accurately from this
synthesized evidence is a daunting task. This is one of the most serious
impediments to accurate factfinding in the criminal justice process.
The process's ability to distinguish between guilty and innocent
defendants is further hindered by the extensive case selection that
precedes adjudication. Guided primarily by the twin goals of reducing
caseloads and obtaining favorable verdicts, both prosecutors and
defense attorneys are disposed to plea bargain cases that they prefer
not to try.21 The strategic calculus that underlies the selection of cases
is driven to a large extent by the attorneys' predictions of the jury's
20. While the primary purpose of human testimony is supposedly to convey sensory
information, in practice witnesses are oftentimes intricately entangled in the social tragedy
surrounding the criminal event and at times also vested in the outcome of the case. Defendants
who testify in their own defense are habitually motivated to save themselves from punishment.
Victim-witnesses too can be motivated towards a particular outcome, typically, to see their
perceived perpetrators suffer punishment. A witness's motivation can strengthen her
persuasiveness and thus affect the outcome of the case. Cf. Craig A. Anderson, Motivational and
Performance Deficits in Interpersonal Settings: The Effect of Attributional Style, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1136, 1142-43 (1983) (analyzing the effect of motivation on the
likelihood of success).
Yet even seemingly disinterested witnesses can become swayed towards a particular side of
the case. Lawyers routinely prepare witnesses prior to the trial; indeed, failing to do so can
amount to a breach of the professional responsibility owed to the client. Professional ethics
standards permit lawyers to engage in serious discussions with the witnesses about their
testimony. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 (2000). The concern is
that this process can mold the witness's testimony to fit a particular result, thus weakening its
correspondence to the true facts. One study found that after being interviewed by a simulated
lawyer, witness testimony became skewed in favor of the side of that lawyer. Blair H. Sheppard
& Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer's Role
and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 321-25 (1980). Another study
found that forewarning a prosecution witness about an expected hostile cross-examination by the
defense attorney resulted in a strengthening of the witness's inculpating testimony and in higher
conviction rates. The effect was most pronounced for witnesses whose testimony was actually
mistaken. Gary L. Wells, Tamara J. Ferguson & R. C. L. Lindsay, The Tractability of Eyewitness
Confidence and Its Implications for Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688, 693 (1981).
Moreover, the mere summoning a witness to testify for one of the parties can create an affiliation
and even camaraderie between the witness and that side. One study found that the mere
assignment of bystander witnesses to testify for one side or the other swayed their testimony
towards the assigned side. Neil Vidmar & Nancy MacDonald Laird, Adversary Social Roles:
Their Effects on Witnesses' Communication of Evidence and the Assessment of Adjudicators, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 888,893-95 (1983).
21. In some instances, such as murder charges and third-strike prosecutions, prosecutors
might not offer a plea deal, and defendants might be inclined to proceed to trial even in the face
of strong inculpating evidence.
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reactions to the evidence. Thus, cases are more likely to go to trial
when the expectations of the jury's decision are not easily predictable,
that is, where the evidence is least clear. Moreover, anecdotal data
indicate that some innocent defendants prioritize proving their
innocence over the cost-benefit calculations that generally dictate plea
bargains.22 Likewise, laboratory data show that innocent defendants
are less likely to strike a plea bargain than guilty ones.23 Thus,
innocent defendants are more inclined to go to trial than guilty ones.
Finally, the manner in which verdicts are impacted by an error
depends on the particular constellation of the case. Some errors bear
nondirectional, random effects, thus resulting in a stochastic
distribution of false convictions and false acquittals. Other types of
error, however, harbor systematic biases towards either one of the
sides, and will naturally tend to sway the verdict in the respective
direction. Yet, even nondirectional factors can have systematic effects
on adjudicative outcomes, as astute attorneys can leverage these
factors in plea negotiations or deploy them to their advantage at trial.
A. Eyewitness Identification Testimony
About three-quarters of the known false convictions were
caused primarily or exclusively by a misidentification of an innocent
suspect. 24 A key feature of identification evidence is that the accuracy
of identifications of strangers varies widely. In one study, changes in
the witnessing conditions of the same person resulted in swings of
22. See, e.g., Jim Vertuno, Judge Clears Dead Texas Man of Rape Conviction, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Feb. 7, 2009, at Bi (discussing the case of Timothy Cole, who refused to plead guilty
to rape charges; Cole was exonerated ten years after he died in prison while serving his
sentence); Phoebe Zerwick, Murder, Race, Justice: The State vs. Darryl Hunt, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
Nov. 16-23, 2007, http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com/frontStories.html (discussing the case of
Darryl Hunt, who refused to plead guilty to murder and rape charges; Hunt was exonerated
nearly twenty years later).
23. W. Larry Gregory et al., Social Psychology and Plea Bargaining: Applications,
Methodology, and Theory, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1521, 1521 (1978); Avishalom Tor
et al., Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
97, 99-100 (2010).
24. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78 (2008); Gross et al.,
supra note 7, at 542-43; Eyewitness Misidentification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understandlEyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Nov.
11, 2010). The prevalence of misidentifications amongst the known wrongful convictions stems
from the fact that a disproportionate number of exonerations are for crimes of rape, which tend
to be based on identification evidence.
[Vol. 64:1:143
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accuracy levels from fourteen to eighty-eight percent.25  Many
thousands of naturalistic and experimental observations reveal a
relatively stable pattern. Data from real-life cases show that about
forty-five percent of witnesses pick the suspect, thirty-five percent
decline to make a choice, and twenty percent pick an innocent filler.
26
Similar data are observed in the laboratory.27 In other words, about
one out of every three positive identifications is wrong. Much of the
psychological research that has been acknowledged in legal debates
concerns the accuracy of witnesses' identifications. 28 The following
discussion focuses rather on the adeptness of jurors in assessing those
identifications, that is, in distinguishing between accurate and
mistaken witnesses. The research indicates that people are not
particularly adept at this task. Studies find that simulated jurors are
just as likely to believe accurate and inaccurate identifications. 29 The
25. D. Stephen Lindsay, J. Don Read & Kusum Sharma, Accuracy and Confidence in Person
Identification: The Relationship Is Strong When Witnessing Conditions Vary Widely, 9 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 215, 216 (1998).
26. Most of the naturalistic data on this effect comes from police records in the United
Kingdom, where identification procedures are generally superior to those used in the United
States and where police data are more accessible to researchers. Cases reviewed by Valentine
and colleagues covering 584 witnesses found rates of forty-one percent identifications of the
suspect (closest approximation of correct identifications), thirty-nine percent no-choice decisions,
and twenty-one percent foil identifications. Tim Valentine et al., Characteristics of Eyewitness
Identification That Predict the Outcome of Real Lineups, 17 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 969,
974 (2003). Wright and McDaid examined identifications involving 1,569 witnesses and found
rates of thirty-nine percent, forty-one percent, and twenty percent, correspondingly. Daniel B.
Wright & Anne T. McDaid, Comparing System and Estimator Variables Using Data from Real
Line-Ups, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 75, 77 (1996). The limited available data from the
United States shows similar distributions: police records of identifications performed in
Sacramento County in 1987-1998 show that fifty percent of the witnesses chose the suspect,
twenty-six percent declined to pick anyone, and twenty-four percent pointed the finger at
innocent fillers. In total, this study covered 271 cases that involved 623 identification procedures.
Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An
Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 479-84 (2001).
27. A meta-analysis of ninety-four laboratory experiments shows that forty-six percent of
the witnesses chose the perpetrator correctly, thirty-three percent declined to choose, and
twenty-one percent chose innocent foils. These numbers pertain to procedures where the target
was present in the lineup. Steven E. Clark, Ryan T. Howell & Sherrie L. Davey, Regularities in
Eyewitness Identification, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 187, 192 (2008).
28. For reviews of the research, see 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (R.C.L.
Lindsay et al. eds., 2007); SIMON, supra note 9, ch. 3.
29. For example, a study conducted in an Ontario courthouse found no differences in the
believability of accurate and inaccurate identifications (sixty-eight percent and seventy percent,
respectively). R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A
Replication and Extension, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336 (1989). Another study found
comparable belief in witnesses who provided accurate (fifty percent) and inaccurate (forty-nine
percent) identifications. Margaret C. Reardon & Ronald P. Fisher, Effect of Viewing the Interview
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causes for this performance are that people overtrust identifications,
are insensitive to accuracy factors, and overweigh witness confidence.
To make things worse, factfinders are also presented with
substandard identification testimony.
Overtrusting Identifications. A starting point for evaluating
people's ability to assess identification testimony is to gauge their
trust in human capabilities of identification in general. General beliefs
are important in that they affect specific judgments: jurors who tend
to trust identification generally are more likely to believe a specific
identification. For one, people overestimate their own capabilities.
Unrealistic beliefs were manifested in a large survey of jury-eligible
citizens in Washington, D.C. Two-thirds of the respondents endorsed
the statement "I never forget a face," and three-quarters agreed with
the statement "I have an excellent memory." Only one-half of the
respondents disagreed with analogizing memories of traumatic events
to video recordings. 30 People also overestimate their capabilities when
asked to predict how they would perform on various experimental
tasks. For example, ninety-seven percent of respondents estimated
that they would succeed in an identification task in which fifty percent
of the actual participants failed.31 Misjudgments of performance were
observed also in studies of face recognition under suboptimal viewing
conditions. Participants believed that they would succeed in
recognizing faces in conditions under which they themselves had
failed to do so successfully on a prior test.
32
People also tend to overestimate the performance of others. In
one study, one of every six participants estimated that the witnesses
would pick an innocent filler at a lineup, while the actual rate of
identifying an innocent filler was almost eighty percent.33 Another
and Identification Process on Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Accuracy, APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. (forthcoming).
30. Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JuRIMETRIcs J. 177, 196 (2006).
31. Daniel T. Levin et al., Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive Error of
Overestimating Change-Detection Ability, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 397, 402 (2000).
32. Erin M. Harley et al., The "Saw-It-All-Along" Effect: Demonstrations of Visual
Hindsight Bias, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 960, 964-65
(2004).
33. For these and other estimation studies, see Gary L. Wells, How Adequate is Human
Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 256, 264 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984). While most estimation
studies show a consistent pattern of overestimation, one study found both over- and
underestimation. A. Daniel Yarmey, Eyewitness Recall and Photo Identification: A Field
Experiment, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 53, 62 (2004).
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study found that eighty percent of jury-eligible members of a Florida
community overestimated the accuracy of identifications made by the
store clerks who actually participated in a field study. Based on these
results, in about seven juries out of ten, at least ten jurors would be
prone to overbelieve an identification.
34
Overtrusting identification performance has been found also in
studies of simulated trials. For example, a Canadian study found that
simulated jurors judged the identifications to be accurate and voted to
convict in sixty-eight percent of the cases, when the actual rate of
accuracy was only fifty percent.35 The rate of belief was particularly
high (seventy-seven percent) for witnesses who expressed high
confidence.
36
Insensitivity to Accuracy Factors. As mentioned above,
identification accuracy is highly susceptible to the specific factors of
the case, resulting in remarkable swings from very low to very high
levels of accuracy. It follows that to distinguish between accurate and
inaccurate identifications, factfinders need to be aware of these factors
and the impact they bear on identifications. Thus, a key question in
determining people's diagnostic capabilities is the extent to which they
are knowledgeable about and sensitive to these factors.
Survey data show that people have limited knowledge of the
accuracy factors. In one survey, students and jury-eligible citizens
recognized accuracy factors between one-third and one-half of the
time. This performance was significantly better than chance (twenty-
five percent), but overall rather poor.37 Another series of studies found
that jury-eligible citizens and experts agreed on only four out of thirty
accuracy factors.38 Poor appreciation for accuracy factors was revealed
34. The mean overestimation level was eighty-four percent. John C. Brigham & Robert K.
Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 28 (1983).
35. R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and
Across Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 83 (1981).
36. Id.
37. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common
Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15, 17 (1982).
38. All four items concerned incident factors, that is, factors that are related to the viewing
of the perpetrator by the witness. There was no agreement on any system factors, which pertain
to the investigative procedures conducted by the police. Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness
Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to
Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 119 (2006). People's lack of familiarity
with system factors was most apparent in a study that asked respondents to generate their own
list of factors, which they believed influence identification accuracy. Only one percent of the
generated factors pertained to system factors. John S. Shaw III et al., A Law Perspective on the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 29 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 52, 65 (1999).
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also in the above-mentioned survey conducted with jury-eligible
respondents in Washington D.C. A majority of respondents
overweighed the diagnosticity of witness confidence, almost three-
quarters failed to realize the detrimental effect of biasing lineup
instructions, and almost one-half failed to appreciate the advantage of
conducting blind lineups.
39
A large experimental study found that simulated jurors were
flatly insensitive to the nine factors that are known to impair
identifications, but were influenced by the witness's stated confidence,
which, as discussed below, is not a good indicator of accuracy.
40
Another study found overall insensitivity to the witness's viewing
conditions, such as the level of illumination, distance to the
perpetrator, and duration of exposure. 41 Simulated jurors have also
been found to be relatively insensitive to the cross-race bias42 and to
biased instructions, 43 and only marginally sensitive to the similarity of
the suspect to the fillers. 44
Insensitivity to witnessing conditions is manifested by the
tendency to overtrust witnesses who viewed the target under poor
witnessing conditions. One study found that when the rate of correct
identifications was merely thirty-three percent, the witnesses were
believed by sixty-two percent of the simulated jurors. 45 Juror
insensitivity to the nuances of identifications was observed also in a
study that compared lay people's judgment of an identification in five
similar vignettes. Two findings were of note. First, a patently
39. A majority of respondents did, however, appreciate the problematic nature of showups.
Schmechel et al., supra note 30, at 199-201.
40. Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 41, 53 (1988). The study tested 321 students and 129 jury-eligible citizens. The
witness was said to be either eighty percent confident or one-hundred percent certain. Id. at 45-
47; Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 185, 187 (1990).
41. R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Evaluations of Eyewitness Testimony: A Test of
Metamemory Hypotheses, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 455-57 (1986).
42. In this study, the rate of convictions was unaffected by whether the black suspect was
identified by a white or a black witness. Jordan Abshire & Brian H. Bornstein, Juror Sensitivity
to the Cross-Race Effect, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 471, 476-78 (2003).
43. In an estimation study, participants made similar predictions of filler choices in target-
absent conditions where the witness was given biased and unbiased lineup instructions (sixteen
percent and eighteen percent, respectively), while the actual rate of filler choices was seventy-
eight percent and thirty-three percent respectively, Wells, supra note 33, at 264.
44. Jennifer L. Devenport et al., How Effective Are the Cross-Examination and Expert
Testimony Safeguards? Jurors' Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup
Procedures, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1042, 1052 (2002).
45. Lindsay et al., supra note 35, at 79.
[Vol. 64:1:143156
2011] LIMITED DIAGNOSTICITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
unreliable identification was believed by as many as forty-two percent
of respondents. Second, three substandard identifications were judged
to be just as reliable as a reliable one.
46
It should be added that even if jurors were appropriately
sensitive to the factors that hinder identifications, in real life their
assessments would be impeded by a lack of reliable information to
enable the evaluation of those factors. In many cases, factfinders must
rely on the witnesses' own reports of properties such as distance,
duration, and illumination at the time of the viewing, as the witnesses
themselves are the only source of this information. The research casts
a doubt over these self-reports, as people tend to shrink assessments
of distances, exaggerate estimates of duration, and fail to notice
inferior illumination, all of which result in inflated assessments of
accuracy.
47
Overweighing Witness Confidence. A considerable amount of
research finds that factfinders place a great deal of weight on
witnesses' confidence in their identifications. One study found that
eyewitness confidence was a stronger predictor of jurors' decisions
than the actual accuracy of the identifications. 48 Simulated jurors
have been found to trust identifications by confident witnesses twice
as often as unconfident witnesses. 49 Witnesses who testified that they
were "completely certain" were three times more likely to be judged
accurate than those who reported being "somewhat uncertain."50 In
46. All eyewitness vignettes described the same factual pattern (a burglary followed by a
sexual assault). The strong identification scenario yielded a mean estimate of witness accuracy of
seventy-one percent, whereas in the other three scenarios, the rates of accuracy were sixty-five
percent, sixty-eight percent, and sixty-seven percent.
This study was part of the Juror--Beliefs Survey, which tested a wide range of lay people's
beliefs, knowledge, and opinions regarding the criminal justice system. The survey sample
consisted of 650 respondents, half of whom were from a general sample of Internet users and half
were USC undergraduate students. Dan Simon, Douglas Stenstrom & Stephen J. Read, Jurors'
Background Knowledge and Beliefs (Paper presented at Am. Psychology & Law Soc'y annual
meeting, Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p229087_index.html.
47. See e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Time Went by So Slowly: Overestimation of Event
Duration by Males and Females, 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 3, 10 (1987); Melissa Ann Pigott
et al., A Field Study on the Relationship Between Quality of Eyewitnesses' Descriptions and
Identification Accuracy, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 84, 84, 87-88 (1990).
48. Lindsay et al., supra note 35, at 334.
49. The rate of belief was sixty-three percent for confident witnesses and thirty-three
percent for witnesses who expressed low confidence. R.C.L. Lindsay, Expectations of Eyewitness
Performance: Jurors' Verdicts Do Not Follow from Their Beliefs, in ADULT EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 362, 369 (David Frank Ross et al. eds., 1994).
50. The rates of belief for witnesses who claimed to be "completely certain" and "somewhat




another study, conviction rates were almost fifty percent higher when
the prosecution eyewitness stated that he was "100% confident" than
when he "could not say that he was 100% confident." 51 Witness
confidence has also been found to wipe out jurors' sensitivity to
witnessing factors.5
2
The reliance on witness confidence as a proxy for accuracy
would be helpful if it were a good marker of accuracy. The
experimental findings cast some doubt over this proposition. Studies
show that the statistical relationship between identification accuracy
and witness confidence is about 0.4.53 While positive, this correlation
by itself is not strongly diagnostic. To illustrate, where the base rate of
accuracy is fifty percent, a coefficient of 0.4 means that only seventy
percent of witnesses who claim to be absolutely confident are in fact
correct. 54
Substandard Identification Testimony. If people's ability to
decipher identification testimony is imperfect under the controlled
conditions of the laboratory, it becomes considerably less reliable with
the substandard testimony that is often proffered in real-life trials.
First, there is reason to suspect that a substantial number of
identifications presented at trial are unreliable because of the
improper manner in which the procedures were conducted. Due to the
lack of uniformity and general informality of investigative practices
across the 17,800 law enforcement departments nationwide, there is
substantial variance in the identification procedures used. Large
numbers of police personnel who conduct identification procedures are
unaware of correct procedures and lack knowledge about the
51. Scott E. Culhane & Harmon M. Hosch, An Alibi Witness' Influence on Mock Jurors'
Verdicts, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1604, 1610-11 (2004).
52. One study found that manipulating the viewing conditions affected judgments of
nonconfident witnesses (forty-seven percent, fifty-four percent, and seventy-six percent for the
three respective viewing conditions), but not of confident ones (seventy-six percent, seventy-six
percent, and seventy-eight percent, respectively). Lindsay et al., supra note 35, at 84.
53. See Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-
analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 315, 319-21 (1995); Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence and the
Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 28, at 377, 377-425. This correlation pertains to witnesses who choose a
target at the lineup. This category of witnesses is most relevant to criminal cases, because
witnesses who fail to pick anyone at the lineup are not likely to be called to testify.
54. Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Eyewitness
Identification: Effects of Lineup Instructions, Foil Similarity, and Target-Absent Base Rates, 12 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 11, 25 (2006).
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intricacies of witness memory.55 Indeed, a large number of the DNA
exoneration cases reveal that the procedures used to convict these
innocent defendants amounted to poor, sometimes shameful, police
work.56 Lacking both the information about what transpired during
the lineup and the knowledge about how variations in the procedures
can distort identifications, jurors cannot be expected to detect these
mistakes. The prevalence of inadequate identification procedures can
be explained by the Supreme Court's permissive stance towards
improper procedures.
57
Second, jurors are presented not with the raw evidence, as
initially observed by the witness, but with the synthesized testimony
as it evolved through the investigative and pretrial phases. Witnesses'
memories of the perpetrator decay with the passage of time and are
readily contaminated by exposure to composite drawings,58 mug
shots, 59  misleading questions,60  and misleading descriptions.
61
Moreover, synthesized testimony is also more likely to be reported
with higher levels of confidence, which further weakens the accuracy-
confidence relationship. A large body of research shows that
confidence is a malleable construct that is sensitive to error,
distortion, and manipulation. Fictitious feedback from the
administrator ("good, you identified the suspect") has been found to
boost witness confidence,6 2 and that in turn increases factfinders' trust
55. Richard Wise et al., What U.S. Law Enforcement Officers Know and Believe About
Eyewitness Factors, Eyewitness Interviews and Identification Procedures, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2010).
56. See SIMON, supra note 9, ch. 3.
57. Most notable in this regard are the Court's decisions in the cases of Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 200 (1972), and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977), which permitted the
admission of identifications borne by suggestive police procedures. For a discussion, see SIMON,
supra note 9, ch. 7.
58. Felicity Jenkins & Graham Davies, Contamination of Facial Memory Through Exposure
to Misleading Composite Pictures, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 164, 173-75 (1985).
59. Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect
Photograph on a Later Identification by an Eyewitness, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 616, 620-22
(1980).
60. Kenneth R. Weingardt et al., Viewing Eyewitness Research from a Metacognitive
Perspective, in METACOGNITION: KNOWING ABOUT KNOWING 157, 159-64 (Janet Metcalfe &
Arthur P. Shimamura eds., 1995).
61. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May be
Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323, 332-34 (1980).
62. Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation
Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117-18
(2002); Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-
analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 J. APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864-
66 (2006); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect" Feedback to
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in the identifications. 63 Confidence has also been found to be inflated
by communication with co-witnesses, 64 exposure to identifications by
co-witnesses, 65 and by exposure to other inculpatory evidence against
the suspect.66 By the time witnesses testify in court, they are generally
less accurate and more confident than warranted, thus making the
identifications appear more reliable than they really are. Moreover,
confident witnesses are likely to be overrepresented at trial because
prosecutors are most likely to try cases when they have confident
eyewitnesses.
Finally, jurors' ability to decipher identification testimony is
hampered also by the practice of in-court identifications. As discussed
elsewhere, identifications performed in open court provide no
meaningful test of witnesses' memory, and all but guarantee the
identification of the person sitting in the defendant's seat. As such,
these procedures are uninformative at best and highly prejudicial at
worst.
67
B. Event Memory Testimony
The bulk of the evidence presented at criminal trials consists of
the witnesses' memorial accounts of the criminal event. Event memory
pertains to the question what happened? The assessment of testimony
for events can entail two distinct modes of judgment. When the juror
has reason to suspect the witness's honesty, she is concerned mostly
with trying to determine whether the witness is lying. When the juror
has no reason to suspect the witness's honesty, she is concerned
primarily with evaluating the accuracy of the memorial account. The
former task will be examined below. For now, the discussion is
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 360, 372-74 (1998). These findings have been replicated in real life identification
procedures conducted by the police in the UK. Daniel B. Wright & Elin M. Skagerberg,
Postidentification Feedback Affects Real Eyewitnesses, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 172, 175-76 (2007).
63. See Amy Bradfield Douglass et al., Does Post-identification Feedback Affect Evaluations
of Eyewitness Testimony and Identification Procedures?, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 282, 291-93
(2010).
64. See Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 489, 494-96 (2007).
65. C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-
witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 720-22 (1994).
66. See Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence:
Can Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 122, 125-26 (2009)
(examining the contamination effect created by inculpatory confession introduction).
67. See id. ch. 3.
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concerned with assessments of testimony from witnesses who might
be mistaken, but are not suspected of deliberate deceit.
The assessment of a witness's memory for the event boils down
to distinguishing between true and false memories. A large body of
basic- and applied-psychological research demonstrates that human
memory is a powerful cognitive apparatus, but it can be fickle and is
vulnerable to error and contamination. For one, people's memories are
invariably incomplete, in that oftentimes they do not contain all of the
details that might be needed to solve a given crime. A witness cannot
be expected to remember the color of the assailant's jacket, and his
tattoo, and the exact words he uttered, and the precise sequence of
events, and so on. Human memory is strongest in remembering the
gist of events, that is, the deeper, more practical and meaningful
aspects of the episode. Specific verbatim details are least likely to be
noticed and encoded, are the quickest to decay, and are most
vulnerable to contamination. 68 Second, people's memories are not
always accurate. False memories can occur spontaneously, such as
when people confuse facts from different events, fill memory gaps with
mistaken information, and interpret events to match their schemas
and expectations. 69 False memories can also be induced by external
sources, such as exposure to postevent information and faulty
investigative procedures.
70
The question is how, and how well, do people assess other
people's memory for events. A number of laboratory experiments
reveal inconsistent and overall weak performance, with accuracy
levels ranging from fifty to seventy-five percent (with fifty percent
being chance level). 71 To better appreciate people's capabilities, it
would be helpful to examine the psychological processes involved in
68. C.J. Brainerd & V.F. Reyna, Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory, 11 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 166-67 (2002); C.J. Brainerd & V.F. Reyna, Gist Is the Grist:
Fuzzy-Trace Theory and the New Intuitionism, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 3, 34-36 (1990).
69. See generally DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND
FORGETS AND REMEMBERS (2001).
70. Specifically, the research shows that false memories can be generated by common
interviewing practices such as implying incorrect facts, posing leading and suggestive questions,
prompting for repetition and extra effort at retrieval, and by encouraging witnesses to imagine,
speculate and guess facts that they cannot recall. For research on event memory, see generally
SIMON, supra note 9, at ch. 4; 1 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 28
(collection of essays and articles discussing memory of events).
71. See, e.g., Jessica M. Hanba & Maria S. Zaragoza, Interviewer Feedback in Repeated
Interviews Involving Forced Confabulation, 21 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 433, 440, 448, 453
(2007); Jonathan W. Schooler et al., Qualities of the Unreal, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 171, 178 (1986).
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assessing other people's memory. Making reliable judgments of other
people's memory requires that the memory contains observable and
valid cues that are indicative of the memory's accuracy, and that the
factfinder detect those cues and interpret them correctly.
72
One accuracy cue that is commonly used to assess other
peoples' memories is the vividness of the memorial account, most
notably the richness of detail it contains.73 As discussed below, this cue
is used for a host of other judgments. 74 For example, a series of studies
showed that the believability of the testimony of a prosecution witness
was influenced by the inclusion of trivial details. In a simulated trial
for a robbery-murder, testimony by a convenience store clerk that
explicitly detailed the items taken by the perpetrator prior to the
shooting (a six-pack of Diet Pepsi, Kleenex, and Tylenol) made a
greater impact than did an otherwise identical testimony that only
mentioned that the perpetrator took "a few store items."75 A second
accuracy cue that observers use is the consistency of the witness's
memorial accounts. 76 A number of studies found that inconsistent
testimony resulted in substantial decreases in the believability of the
72. Neither the emitting of cues by the witness nor the detection and interpretation by the
observer needs to be done via explicit processing. Much of this kind of processing is likely to be
done implicitly, that is, without conscious awareness.
73. Other aspects of vividness have been tested less frequently. These include the witness's
rate of pauses, hesitations, and response latency. Hanba & Zaragoza, supra note 71, at 449.
Other aspects include the number of "don't know" answers, verbal hedges, and hesitations.
Michael R. Leippe et al., Eyewitness Persuasion: How and How Well Do Fact Finders Judge the
Accuracy of Adults' and Children's Memory Reports?, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181,
185 (1992).
74. This cue is used also for monitoring the source of one's own memories. Marcia K.
Johnson, Julie G. Bush & Karen J. Mitchell, Interpersonal Reality Monitoring: Judging the
Sources of Other People's Memories, 16 SOC. COGNITION 199, 219 (1998).
75. The detailed testimony was found to be more believable (fifty-four versus forty, on a
scale of zero to one hundred), and to result in higher conviction rates (twenty-nine percent versus
eleven percent). Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony and
Mock Juror Judgments, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1171, 1171, 1189-91 (1988) [hereinafter
Bell & Loftus, Degree of Detail]; see also Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in
the Courtroom, 49 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 662-63 (1985) [hereinafter Bell & Loftus,
Vivid Persuasion]; Lara Keogh & Roslyn Markham, Judgements of Other People's Memory
Reports: Differences in Reports as a Function of Imagery Vividness, 12 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 159, 169 (1998). Contra Kerri L. Pickel, Evaluation and Integration of Eyewitness
Reports, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 569, 592 (1993). The vividness of memory is closely related to
the concept of memory fluency. See John S. Shaw, Increases in Eyewitness Confidence Resulting
from Postevent Questioning, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 126, 139-40 (1996).
76. Neil Brewer et al., Beliefs and Data on the Relationship Between Consistency and
Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 13 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 297, 311-12 (1999).
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The third commonly used accuracy cue is the person's stated
level of confidence.78 As with judgments of identifications, factfinders
are more likely to believe testimony for the event that is accompanied
by high levels of confidence. One study found that more confident
prosecution witnesses ("I am absolutely sure" versus "I am reasonably
sure") led to double the estimations of the probability of guilt and
quadruple the conviction rates.7 9 The effect of confidence has been
replicated in a number of studies.
80
The question, then, is whether these cues are actually
indicative of memory accuracy. Needless to mention, if the cues do not
correspond to accuracy, or if they correspond only weakly, one ought to
be skeptical of observers' reliance on them.8' As it turns out, the
research casts doubt over the diagnosticity of these cues. The richness
of detail does provide diagnostic value, but that diagnosticity is
limited to the specific corresponding fact. It cannot sustain a broader
assessment of the witness's memory for the event more generally, an
inference that people naturally make. Generalizing from the richness
of detail of a memorial account seems to be premised on the notion
77. One study found that inconsistent testimony reduced the level of guilty verdicts from
fifty-three percent to seven percent. Neil Brewer & R.M. Hupfeld, Effects of Testimonial
Inconsistencies and Witness Group Identity on Mock-Juror Judgments, 34 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 493, 507 (2004). Prosecution witnesses who provided inconsistent testimony about a
robbery were found to be less effective than those who provided consistent testimony (2.9 versus
4.3 on a zero-to-six scale), and their testimony yielded lower conviction rates (twenty percent
versus sixty-nine percent). Garrett L. Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in
Eyewitness Testimony on Mock-Juror Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170, 173 (1996).
Similar consistency effects were observed with college students and jury-eligible community
members. Garrett L. Berman et al., Effects of Inconsistent Eyewitness Statements on Mock-
Jurors' Evaluations of the Eyewitness, Perceptions of Defendant Culpability and Verdicts, 19 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 79, 84-85 (1995).
78. Brewer et al., supra note 76, at 308.
79. Highly confident prosecution testimony resulted in higher assessments of guilt (fifty-
seven percent versus thirty-two percent) and a higher conviction rate (thirty-nine percent versus
nine percent). The confidence manipulation also swamped any inferences drawn from the
consistency of the witness's story. Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial
Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
353, 359-60 (2002).
80. See, e.g., Leippe et al., supra note 73; Pickel, supra note 75; Bernard E. Whitley, Jr. &
Martin S. Greenberg, The Role of Eyewitness Confidence in Juror Perceptions of Credibility, 16 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 387 (1986).
81. It is theoretically possible that there are other accuracy cues that have not been
identified by researchers, though it is not very likely that powerful cues have been completely
overlooked.
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that memories are monolithic entities. However, memory research
provides a wealth of data indicating that memories are constructed
from multiple fragments, which are often encoded, stored, and
retrieved independently from one another. The fragments are bound
with different memory sources, are stored in different parts of the
brain, and decay at different rates.8 2 It follows that accuracy on some
aspects of the event is a poor indicator for accuracy on other aspects.83
Thus, in the above-mentioned study of the convenience store murder,
a witness's recollection that the perpetrator took Diet Pepsi is
indicative of the fact that the witness does indeed remember which
soda was taken. It does not, however, warrant any inferences about
the accuracy of the witness's memory about any other aspect of her
testimony. Moreover, memories for different aspects of an event are at
times inversely related. Notably, it has been found that the better the
witness's memory of the peripheral details of a criminal event, the
poorer she performs in identifying the perpetrator.8 4 Similar issues
arise with respect to the diagnosticity of the consistency cue, as
consistent recollection on one aspect of a memory is a weak indicator
of the strength of the memory overall. Indeed, the statistical
relationship between memory consistency and memory accuracy has
been found to be a modest 0.3.85
Doubts also plague the diagnosticity of the widely used witness
confidence cue. Confidence is not related to accuracy as intimately as
people tend to believe, as memories tend to be reported with
82. See DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY 40-44, 110-12 (1996); Scott C.
Brown & Fergus I.M. Craik, Encoding and Retrieval of Information, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF MEMORY 93, 93, 98-103 (Endel Tulving & Fergus I.M. Craik eds., 2000); Karen J. Mitchell &
Marcia K. Johnson, Source Monitoring: Attributing Mental Experiences, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MEMORY supra, at 179, 182-84, 187-88; Neal E.A. Kroll et al., Cohesion Failure as
a Source of Memory Illusions, 35 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 176, 193 (1996).
83. Brewer et al., supra note76, at 309-11; Julian A.E. Gilbert & Ronald P. Fisher, The
Effects of Varied Retrieval Cues on Reminiscence in Eyewitness Memory, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 723, 735-37 (2006).
84. Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682, 686 (1981). In another study, a negative correlation of -0.21 was found
between the number of memorized peripheral details and the accuracy of identifications of the
perpetrator. Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: The Role of
System and Estimator Variables, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 245 (1987). A field study conducted
in Tokyo found no relationship between the memory for the event and identification accuracy.
Makiko Naka et al., Eyewitness Testimony After Three Months: A Field Study on Memory for an
Incident in Everyday Life, 38 JAPANESE PSYCHOL. RES. 14, 21-23 (1996). This finding is likely
explained by the limited cognitive resources. The attention paid towards the peripheral details
comes at the expense of attending to other facets of the event.
85. Brewer et al., supra note76, at 301; see Gilbert & Fisher, supra note 83, at 735-37.
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overconfidence across varying levels of accuracy. For example, people
have been found to report ninety percent confidence where they are
only sixty percent accurate, 86 and to report as many as twenty-five
percent of inaccurate memories with maximal confidence.8 7 The
accuracy-confidence correlation has been found to be unstable and
oftentimes weak, ranging from zero to 0.6.88 One set of studies
revealed that even when the confidence-accuracy relationship was
significant, observers tended to "overuse" the reported confidence, that
is, to place more weight on it than warranted by its correspondence
with accuracy.8 9
The three noted accuracy cues are considerably less diagnostic
when assessing the synthesized testimony that is presented at trial.
With regard to the richness of detail, the decay of memory for
verbatim and surface details leaves gaps that people tend to replenish
with information from both internal and external sources.90 However
rich, the specific details testifying witnesses mention are to a large
extent not genuine recollections from the crime scene, and they say
little about the memory for the actual criminal event. It should also be
noted that people's intuitive belief in the richness-of-detail cue can be
86. Par Anders Granhag et al., Effects of Reiteration, Hindsight Bias, and Memory on
Realism in Eyewitness Confidence, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 397, 406 (2000).
87. Jennifer L. Tomes & Albert N. Katz, Confidence-Accuracy Relations for Real and
Suggested Events, 8 MEMORY 273, 279 (2000).
88. Tomes and Katz reported an average confidence-accuracy relationship of about 0.61. Id.
at 278. Leippe, Manion, and Romanczyk observed a correlation as high as 0.5, but it was
significant in only one of three tests. Leippe et al., supra note73, at 193. Another study found
overall weak to nonexistent relationships. John S. Shaw III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated
Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 629, 643 (1996). Shaw and Zerr observed values ranging between 0 and 0.4. John S. Shaw
III & Tana K. Zerr, Extra Effort During Memory Retrieval May Be Associated with Increases in
Eyewitness Confidence, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 326 (2003). Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond,
and Luszcz found no confidence-accuracy relationship at all. Brewer et al., supra note76, at 307.
89. Leippe et al., supra note73, at 195.
90. A slew of studies show that people's false memories are replete with detail. For
example, participants who were misled to believe that a car was traveling fast when it crashed
also tended to report seeing (nonexistent) broken glass at the scene of the accident. Elizabeth F.
Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 588
(1974). Participants who were led to falsely recall riding in a hot-air balloon also tended to report
various details of the experience, including being fearful and feeling the wind blowing in their
face. Maryanne Garry & Kimberly A. Wade, Actually, a Picture Is Worth Less than 45 Words:
Narratives Produce More False Memories than Photographs Do, 12 PSYCHOL. BULL. & REV. 359,
363 (2005). Dutch participants who reported seeing the (nonexistent) video of a plane crash also
reported remembering details about the plane's flight path. Hans F.M. Crombag et al., Crashing
Memories and the Problem of "Source Monitoring', 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 95, 101-02
(1996).
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manipulated at trial. Savvy attorneys can readily encourage witnesses
to include trivial details, praise their witnesses' testimony for
containing details, and attack opposing witnesses for the failure to
recount details or for mentioning mistaken ones. The diagnosticity of
the consistency cue is likewise questionable because synthesized
memorial accounts are often reiterated and rehearsed repeatedly in
preparation for trial.9 1 This cue too is susceptible to manipulation at
trial, as lawyers can praise witnesses for being consistent, irrespective
of their accuracy, and they can catch truthful witnesses in an
inconsistency on some detail or another.
92
Again, synthesized testimony robs the confidence cue of much
of its usefulness. The research indicates that numerous investigative
procedures result in inflation of witnesses' confidence for event
memory. For the most part, boosts in confidence typically coincide
with decreases in accuracy borne by decay and contamination. A
number of studies have found that confidence, but not accuracy, is
boosted by repeated questioning. This effect was strongest for
incorrect responses and for impossible memories, that is, putative
recollections of facts that were not in the original crime scene.
93
Confidence for false memories has been found to be inflated also by a
variety of factors that are oftentimes present in real-life
investigations, such as communicating with co-witnesses, 94 high
motivation at retrieval, 95 engaging in imagination and confabulation,
96
and receiving confirmatory feedback from the interviewer. 97 Providing
91. One study found that repetition of memory tests accompanied with false feedback
boosted the consistency of false memories up to one hundred percent. Hanba & Zaragoza, supra
note 71, at 440.
92. Ronald Fisher et al., The Relation Between Consistency and Accuracy of Eyewitness
Testimony: Legal Versus Cognitive Explanations, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY OF
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 121, 132-34
(Ray Bull et al. eds., 2009).
93. Reid Hastie et al., Eyewitness Testimony: The Dangers of Guessing, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 1,
7-8 (1978); Shaw, supra note 75, at 139-40; Shaw III & McClure, supra note 88, at 646-48.
94. Carl Martin Allwood et al., Eyewitnesses Under Influence: How Feedback Affects the
Realism in Confidence Judgements, 12 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 25, 32-34 (2006).
95. Shaw III & Zerr, supra note 88, at 321-22.
96. Maryanne Garry & Devon L.L. Polaschek, Imagination and Memory, 9 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 6, 7-8 (2000); Maryanne Garry et al., Imagination Inflation:
Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence That It Occurred, 3 PSYCHOL. BULL. & REV.
208, 213 (1996).
97. Allwood et al., supra note 94, at 36; Hanba & Zaragoza, supra note 71, at 451-53;
Michael R. Leippe et al., Effects of Social-Comparative Memory Feedback on Eyewitnesses'
Identification Confidence, Suggestibility, and Retrospective Memory Reports, 28 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 213-16 (2006).
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witnesses with fictitious feedback has been found to reduce the
confidence-accuracy correlation from 0.6 down to zero. 98 In sum,
assessing the accuracy of a memory for an event is a difficult feat.
C. Confession Evidence
Another important type of evidence consists of statements
obtained out of court in which the defendant inculpates himself.
Confessions are widely believed to be powerful inculpatory evidence,
"probably the most probative and damaging evidence, ' 99 a "bombshell
which shatters the defense." 100 Yet, confessions are not always true,
and thus pose a serious challenge for factfinders. Most confessions are
extracted by means of interrogative methods that are not designed to
distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects. These techniques
are avowedly intended to obtain confessions from the suspect at hand,
and are deployed on the assumption that he is indeed the
perpetrator. 101 That determination is typically based on a judgment
that the suspect is deceitful which, as discussed below, often rests on
shaky grounds.
The prospect that a false confession will lead to a false
conviction depends critically on the jury's ability to recognize it as
such. The legal system places much faith in jurors' capabilities in this
regard and applies a liberal standard for admitting contested
confessions into evidence.10 2 Thus, it is important to determine how
good jurors are at distinguishing true confessions from false ones. The
limited available naturalistic data cast some doubt over jurors'
judgments in this regard, as prosecutions based on false confessions
tend to result in convictions. 03 Studies show that lay people believe
98. Tomes & Katz, supra note 87, at 278. Likewise, one study found that the correlation
coefficient dropped significantly once participants were given an incentive on the memory test
(from 0.4 to 0.05). Shaw & Zerr, supra note 88, at 321.
99. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 72 (1979).
100. People v. Schader, 401 P.2d 665, 674 (Cal. 1965).
101. For reviews of the research, see RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND
AMERICAN JUSTICE 195-98 (2008); SIMON, supra note 9, ch. 5; Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of
Confessions, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 193, 221-24 (2008).
102. To admit a confession before a jury, the prosecution need only show that it was made
voluntarily by the deferential standard of preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
103. Two studies have looked closely at real world cases that contained confessions which
were subsequently revealed to have been given by innocent people. Of the cases that went to
trial, 73.3 percent and 81 percent of the respective samples ended up with jury convictions.
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
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that coercive interrogation techniques elicit true confessions but not
false ones. 10 4 Moreover, even when people deem interrogative as
coercive, they do not always adjust their verdicts accordingly. People
tend also to be swayed by inadmissible coerced confessions, which they
are admonished to disregard. 10 5 People appear to accept coercive
interrogation because they believe that the police do not interrogate
innocent suspects or because they feel that it is permissible to behave
unethically to elicit true confessions. 10 6 It should be noted that judges
too appear to be selectively sensitive to coercion. A study of federal
and state judges found a greater willingness to ignore confessions
obtained by impermissibly coercive interrogations when the suspect
was charged with a murder of a police officer than with a less serious
offense. 10
7
It is important to note that even if jurors were perfectly
attuned to the risks of coercion, and even if they translated those
concerns appropriately into verdict decisions, discerning the veracity
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 477-78 (1998). The second study contained confessions by 125 suspects, of
whom seventy-four were released pretrial, fourteen pled guilty, seven were acquitted at trial and
thirty were convicted. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 957 (2004). This data, however, is possibly incomplete
in that some acquittals might not have been counted in these studies.
104. Iris Bland6n-Gitlin et al., Jurors Believe Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit
False Confessions: Will Expert Witness Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?, PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.
(forthcoming). The logic of this position appears to be founded on the notion that furnishing self-
defeating evidence must be an indicator of truth. It is not altogether clear why this should be the
case.
105. The rate of conviction was found to be almost identical when the judge ruled that the
confession was admissible as when he ruled it inadmissible and ordered the jurors to ignore it
(fifty percent versus forty-four percent, high pressure condition only). These rates were
considerably higher than when no confession was presented (nineteen percent). Saul M. Kassin
& Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless Error"
Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 39 (1997). Lower sensitivity to coercive techniques was found by
Bland6n-Gitlin et al., supra note 104. For similar results, see Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall,
Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic
Implication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 247-50 (1991); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instruction, and Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 503-04 (1981) (showing that judicial instruction may not be an effective
solution to juror bias as a result of pretrial confessions).
106. See Linda A. Henkel, Kimberly A. J. Coffman & Elizabeth M. Dailey, A Survey of
People's Attitudes and Beliefs About False Confessions, 26 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 555, 579 (2008); Saul
A. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221, 229 (1997); see also
Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What Do Potential Jurors Know About Police Interrogation and
Techniques and False Confessions?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 381, 395-96 (2009).
107. Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi et al., Context Effects in Judicial Decision Making 30 (CELS 2009
4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=1443596.
2011] LIMITED DIAGNOSTICITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
of confessions in actual criminal cases remains a tall order. The
difficulty stems from the fact that false confessions in the real world
tend to cover up their traces of inaccuracy. A commonly used cue in
assessing confession accuracy is, again, the richness of detail. This cue
is deemed to be diagnostic of the veracity of confessions because only
true perpetrators are believed to be familiar with the specifics of the
criminal event, whereas innocent people are not. This notion is
strongest for details that are not known to the public.
08
Indeed, false confessions invariably come fully packaged with
details. A review of the false confession cases that ended up with DNA
exonerations reveals that innocent confessors provided detailed
accounts in all but two of the thirty-eight cases for which trial
transcripts were available. In nineteen of the cases, the prosecutors
explicitly highlighted this aspect at trial, and emphasized that the
facts were nonpublic and thus could only have been known to the true
perpetrator. 10 9 One prosecutor stated that it was a "mathematically
[sic] impossibility" that the defendant could have guessed so many
details correctly, 10 and another dismissed the defendant's claim of
coercion, emphasizing that he "supplied detail after detail after detail
after detail." ''
When confessions are found to have been false, the most
plausible conclusion is that any nonpublic information divulged by the
defendants was somehow communicated to them by the police.1 12 Still,
in court, the detectives denied having disclosed any facts to the
suspects in twenty-seven of the thirty-eight known cases.11 3 In many
of the confession records, detectives also include assurances from the
108. The Jurors' Beliefs Survey mentioned above reveals that people believe that knowledge
of nonpublic facts is a strong indicator of the confessor's involvement in the crime. The mode and
median responses to this question were both nine, on a scale one to eleven. Simon et al., supra
note 46.
It is not surprising that one of the explicit objectives of police interrogations is to convert the
defendant's admission into an elaborate and detailed postadmission narrative. CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 365-66 (Fred E. Inbau et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
109. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1068-74
(2010).
110. Id. at 1078 (quoting Trial Transcript at 22, Commonwealth v. Godschalk, No. 934-87,
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. May 27, 1987)).
111. Id. at 1066. For analyses of other cases, see LEO, supra note 101, at 195-236.
112. Absent any record of the interrogation, it is hard to tell whether detectives deliberately
feed the information to defendants or merely mention it unwittingly.
113. Garrett, supra note 109, at 1074. In the case of Bruce Godschalk, the detective insisted
in his trial testimony: "Never did I offer anything to him." LEO, supra note 101, at 184.
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defendant that the statement was made of their free will. 1 14 With this
kind of evidence in hand, juries have no apparent reason to question
the veracity of confession, nor do they have the tools to do so.
D. Alibi Testimony
The assessment of alibi evidence poses yet another set of
challenges for the factfinder. While the research on this issue is rather
sparse and its findings relatively intuitive, it helps punctuate the
difficulties in assessing alibis. Alibi evidence involves issues
pertaining both to the construction of the alibi by the suspect, and to
its subsequent believability by third parties. 115 Alibis play an obvious
role in persuading jurors and police officers and they can affect the
outcome of a case also by convincing prosecutors, judges, and even
defense attorneys. The assessment of alibis is closely related to
judgments of deceit, as disbelieved alibis are naturally deemed to be
deceitful, and thus are readily taken to imply guilt. The current
discussion focuses on assessments based on the content of the alibi
claim, not the demeanor of the suspect.
Two intuitions hover over the issue of alibi evidence, giving it
an aura of incredulity. First, alibis are generally treated with
suspicion because perpetrators of crimes are deemed to be willing to
concoct them. Second, it is generally believed that when faced with the
threat of severe punishment, innocent people will invariably be
capable of furnishing a truthful and believable account of their
whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. These intuitions
help explain why some seemingly powerful alibis offered by DNA
exonerees were disbelieved by juries. 116
114. For example, when asked if he was confessing freely, Godschalk responded "On my own
free will," and when asked if he was treated well by the police he replied "Very well." Trial
Transcript supra note 110, at 126-27. Finally, Godschalk added a personal touch by stating that
he was "[t]ruly sorry for what happened, and it's all caused from my drinking problem.... I'm
very sorry for what I've done to these two nice women." Id. at 38-39.
115. For a useful taxonomy on alibi evidence, see Elizabeth A. Olson & Gary L. Wells, W~hat
Makes a Good Alibi? A Proposed Taxonomy, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157, 160-62 (2004).
116. For example, Tim Durham, an Oklahoma man, was convicted primarily on the basis of
an identification by an eleven-year-old girl despite the fact that eleven witnesses placed him in
Dallas at the time of the crime. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 158-71 (2000).
Steven Avery, a Wisconsin man, was convicted based mostly on an eyewitness identification even
though sixteen alibi witnesses testified that he was elsewhere at the time. See Steven Avery, CTR.
ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/
exonerations/wiAverySSummary.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). Both men were subsequently
exonerated on the basis of DNA tests.
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In reality, providing an accurate and believable account of one's
whereabouts at a specific time is not always an easy task. Research
shows that people have poor memories for dates, times, and sequences
of events,117 they often confuse the details of one event with those of
another, and they sometimes fail to recall which other people were
present at which event.118 To provide accounts of their whereabouts,
people often need to reconstruct them, whether by consulting other
people, referring to calendars, or examining records.119
Constructing an alibi is not always possible for the innocent
person. While the commission of a crime is invariably a memorable
event for the perpetrator, it is typically of no significance to others.
Innocent suspects are generally not prepared to be asked to account
for their actions at the particular time, and they lack both the motive
and the opportunity to prepare an alibi in advance of the interview.
Innocent suspects might also feel the need to furnish the alibi on the
spot, which heightens the risk of providing mistaken information.
They might not be sufficiently cautious about offering an incorrect
alibi, believing naively that the truth will eventually come to light.
This lack of caution is particularly likely before the suspect is made
aware of the severity of the charges, or when she is hoping to fend off
the detective with a quick distraction. Constructing an alibi is
particularly difficult for people who lead unstructured and
undocumented lives, such as the unemployed and the self-employed.
Some innocent suspects will simply fail to construct an alibi,
which might be perceived as suggestive of guilt. Others will provide a
mistaken alibi. If refuted by the police, mistaken alibis make the
suspect appear guilty. In some instances, the suspect will seek to
correct her mistaken alibi with information gathered at a subsequent
occasion. That could improve her situation, but the alibi will still be
viewed with heightened skepticism, as inconsistencies in testimony
are generally perceived as a cue for unreliable memory or as an
117. For example, employees in a large manufacturing company had poor memories of their
schedule from one week prior. Margery A. Eldridge et al., Autobiographical Memory and Daily
Schemas at Work, 2 MEMORY 51, 67 (1994). In an interview conducted four to five months
following a memorable shooting incident, no fewer than ten of the thirteen witnesses failed to
recall the month of the incident, and only six recalled the day of the week. John C. Yuille &
Judith L. Cutshall, A Case Study of Eyewitness Memory of a Crime, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 291,
294-96 (1986).
118. Timothy N. Odegard & James M. Lampinen, Memory Conjunction Errors for
Autobiographical Events: More than Just Familiarity, 12 MEMORY 288, 297 (2004).
119. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Gibbons & Charles P. Thompson, Using a Calendar in Event Dating,
15 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 33, 42 (2001) (discussing the use of calendars in reconstructing
events).
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indicator of deceit. It should also be noted that in some situations,
innocent suspects will provide false alibis intentionally. This occurs
when they try to conceal an embarrassing deed, such as visiting a bar
or having an extramarital affair. Ironically, providing a false alibi to
cover up a relatively minor transgression can make the suspect look
guilty of a serious criminal charge.
Even when suspects manage to construct their whereabouts
truthfully and accurately, they stand to be disbelieved unless they can
offer satisfactory corroboration. Alibis can be corroborated by physical
evidence, such as ticket stubs, passport stamps, and surveillance
cameras.120 It is, however, rather rare to possess physical proof of one's
whereabouts, as most people's lives are not documented and do not
produce a constant stream of time-stamped physical traces. A survey
of 125 American and Canadian alibi cases revealed that alibis were
corroborated by physical evidence in fewer than one-tenth of the cases
examined. 121 The research shows that physical evidence is readily
discounted, especially when it is perceived to be susceptible to
fabrication.
122
Alibis can be corroborated also by human testimony, typically,
statements that the suspect was with the corroborating witness
somewhere else at the time of the crime. 123 Corroboration by witnesses
is not always available, as people spend certain amounts of time by
themselves, especially those who live alone. Moreover, a true alibi
might not be corroborated when the corroborating witness himself
cannot construct his whereabouts at the time of the crime, or when his
own account cannot be corroborated reliably. Failures to corroborate
can be costly to defendants, and can even backfire by increasing the
defendant's apparent guilt.
124
120. For example, on a scale of 0 to 10 simulating conditions without witness corroboration,
one study found that security camera evidence increased the believability of the alibi from 4.79
to 6.97 and reduced the judgments of likelihood of guilt from 5.41 to 3.35. Olson & Wells, supra
note 115, at 167 tbl.2, 169 tbl.3.
121. Tara M. Burke & John W. Turtle, Alibi Evidence in Criminal Investigations and Trials:
Psychological and Legal Factors, 1 CANADIAN J. POLICE & SECURITY SERV. 286, 288 (2004).
122. Olson & Wells, supra note 115, at 172-75.
123. On a scale from 0 to 10 without corroborating physical evidence, corroboration from a
convenience store clerk increased the believability of the alibi from 4.79 to 6.63 and reduced the
judgments of likelihood of guilt from 5.41 to 3.98. Id. at 167 tbl.2, 169 tbl.3.
124. One study found a substantial, though not statistically significant, increase in
judgments of guilt following a failure to corroborate the alibi. Hunter A. McAllister & Norman J.
Bregman, Juror Underutilization of Eyewitness Nonidentifications: A Test of the Disconfirmed
Expectancy Explanation, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 28 (1989).
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Most commonly, alibi testimony is discounted due to suspicion
about the credibility of corroborating witnesses. A number of studies
have shown that corroboration by strangers, neighbors, and store
clerks reduces the rate of convictions, but corroboration by friends and
family members does not.1 25 These results are hardly surprising, as a
majority of survey respondents believe that people would lie to the
police rather than see a loved one go to prison. Respondents also
concede that they would do the same. 126 This poses a problem for
corroborating alibis, given that people tend to spend the bulk of their
nonsolitary time in the company of the very people who are most
disbelieved. In the study of 125 alibi cases, only two of the alibis were
supported by people other than friends and family.127 Indeed, the vast
majority of the alibis offered (all unsuccessfully) by DNA exonerees
were corroborated by family members, girlfriends, and friends. 128 As
prosecutors and defense attorneys know full well, though intended as
a shield, alibi testimony can readily serve as a weapon. Whether
present, absent, refuted, or altered, alibi testimony can easily hinder
the factfinder's ability to determine the facts correctly.
125. In one study, the stranger corroborating witness reduced conviction rate from sixty
percent to twenty-seven percent, while the alibi from a brother-in-law was no different from
baseline (fifty-seven percent). Lindsay et al., supra note 41, at 452. Another study found that
corroboration by the defendant's girlfriend did not significantly reduce the conviction rate (forty
percent versus thirty-five percent), but the neighbor's testimony did (16.7 percent). Culhane &
Hosch, supra note 51, at 1612; see also Olson & Wells, supra note 115, at 172 (showing that,
among other things, alibi corroboration from the nonmotivated stranger is seen as more credible
than corroboration from the nonmotivated familiar other).
126. In a survey of 291 jury-eligible undergraduate students, 81.72 percent of respondents
admitted that they would lie to provide a false alibi for their spouse. The numbers were high also
for siblings (77.73 percent) and best friends (67.34 percent), but not for strangers (2.74 percent).
Respondents also reported that they expect other people would do the same. Harmon M. Hosch
et al., Effects of an Alibi Witness' Relationship to the Defendant on Mock Jurors' Judgments, LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. ONLINE FIRST 5 (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.springerlink.com/content/
421916501113p2xlifulltext.pdf.
127. Burke & Turtle, supra note 121, at 288.
128. In the case of Ronald Cotton, for example, a number of his family members testified at
trial that he was at home on the night of the crime. One of the jurors was dismissive of the fact
that all the witnesses "said the same thing." She added: "You knew what the next one was going
to say after about three or four of them had said that he was on the sofa. So that impressed me
as ... that they had been rehearsed, like they had been told what to say. Well, to me, that would
make one think that somebody is guilty." Frontline: What Jennifer Saw (PBS television
broadcast Feb. 25, 1997), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows
/dnaletc/script.html (presenting the viewpoint of jury member Dallas Fry). Cotton was
exonerated based on a DNA test after serving more than ten years in prison. Id.
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E. Judging Deceit
Assessments of testimony are intricately intertwined with
judgments of the witness's truthfulness. While the honesty of a
witness does not ensure accuracy, deceit is a strong indicator of falsity.
The detection of deceit plays a key role in police investigations, 129 and
is often critical in courtroom factfinding. To a certain extent, the real
battle at trial rages over jurors' assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses. To be sure, the legal system places a great deal of trust in
jurors' ability to detect deceit. As the Supreme Court stated, "A
fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is
the lie detector."'130 Jurors are explicitly instructed to rely on the
demeanor of the witnesses in assessing the credibility of the
evidence. 131 The detection of deception is relevant in most trials, in
that doubts over the honesty of witnesses, particularly defendants,
invariably loom in the background. Defendants are likely to be
observed closely, even when they do not testify. Jurors are most likely
to engage in judging demeanor in difficult cases, where the evidence is
ambiguous. Determining that a witness is lying provides a way to
resolve the uncomfortable state of decisional conflict. Invariably, a
determination of deceit on a specific issue undermines the credibility
of that witness's entire testimony and can readily destroy the party's
case completely. The inability to observe witness demeanor is a
principal justification that appellate and habeas courts offer for their
reluctance to intervene in factfinding and their deferential posture
towards trial court findings.
132
Entrusting jurors with the role of lie detector in the absence of
reliable extrinsic evidence is premised on the assumption that they
are capable of detecting deceit from the witness's behavior. To perform
this function successfully, it is first necessary that liars behave
129. Determinations of deceit are regularly used to trigger the deployment of intense
interrogation methods. See LEO, supra note 111, at 119-64, 195-236 (reviewing American police
interrogation structures and providing examples).
130. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1997) (citation omitted).
131. For example, the Massachusetts jury instructions read: "Often it may not be what a
witness says, but how he says it that might give you a clue whether or not to accept his version of
an event as believable. You may consider a witness's appearance and demeanor on the witness
stand, his frankness or lack of frankness in testifying, whether his testimony is reasonable or
unreasonable, probable or improbable." MASS. CRIMINAL MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.260
(2009).
132. The Supreme Court has stated that only the courtroom factfinder can "be aware of the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and
belief in what is said." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
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differently from truth-tellers. Indeed, there are a number of
theoretical reasons why telling a lie would result in subjective
experiences that differ from making honest statements. Telling lies
usually places people in unusual and potentially threatening
situations, which can entail fear of getting caught or compunctions
about being dishonest. This arousal is typically accompanied by
physiological states that are mostly beyond people's control and which
might be observable by others. Unlike truth-tellers, liars tend to try to
control their behavior to feign normal demeanor. Liars also expend
extra cognitive effort to keep their stories straight and to monitor
their apparent believability. 133
The question is whether these phenomenological experiences
manifest themselves in unique patterns of behavior and whether other
people can decipher these behaviors. To detect behavioral leakage, one
must first know what to look for. The cues that people use for this
purpose fall into three types. First, observers can look for verbal cues
that relate to the content of the communication. Verbal cues include
such features as richness of detail, consistency of statements, self-
reference, and response length. A second type of cue consists of
attributes that accompany speech. These para-verbal cues include
voice pitch, response latency, pauses, and "ah" and "um" utterances.
Finally, observers might look to physical cues that are visually
apparent. Visual cues pertain to the witness's demeanor, namely, his
facial expressions, head movements, and a variety of body movements.
The list of potential cues of deceit runs very long. For
illustration, the definition of the term "demeanor" in the sixth edition
of Black's Law Dictionary enumerates twenty different para-verbal
and visual cues, including the witness's hesitation, smiling, zeal,
expression, yawns, use of eyes, and "air of candor."134 There appears to
be considerable consensus among people and even across cultures as
to which behaviors indicate deceit. One study found general
agreement between lay people and police officers with respect to sixty-
four different cues. 3 5 While the panoply of perceived cues covers
almost every imaginable vocal and corporal behavior, one particular
cue-gaze aversion, and its reciprocal, maintaining eye contact-is
singularly prominent. Gaze aversion is the most often mentioned cue
133. Miron Zuckerman, Bella M. DePaulo & Robert Rosenthal, Verbal and Nonverbal
Communication of Deception, 14 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 10, 38-39 (1981).
134. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (6th ed. 1990).
135. Lucy Akehurst et al., Lay Persons' and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding Deceptive
Behaviour, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 461, 464, 468 (1996).
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by both lay people and professional lie-catchers, including police patrol
officers, detectives, custom officials, and prison guards. 136 Prison
inmates, in contrast, place much less trust in it.137 The belief in the
unique diagnosticity of gaze aversion appears to be a pan-cultural
phenomenon. A survey conducted with more than 11,000 respondents
in fifty-eight countries yielded 103 spontaneously proposed cues
believed to be associated with deceit. Of them, gaze aversion was cited
by two-thirds of the respondents, more than twice the rate of any
other cue.'
38
The key question is whether the cues people use are actually
indicative of deceit. This question was the subject of a large meta-
analysis covering data from 120 samples, encompassing some 6,000
participants. Of the 158 cues analyzed, the vast majority was found to
be unrelated to lying. The few cues that were found to be valid were
mostly verbal (notably, low richness of detail, discrepancies,
ambivalence, and noncooperativeness) and para-verbal (voice pitch
and vocal tension). Invariably, visually observable behaviors-namely,
the speaker's demeanor, including gaze aversion-were not found to
be related to deceit. 139 The findings revealed also that, while people
tend to believe that the various physical behavioral cues are activated
by deceit, a substantial number of them are actually inhibited by it.140
Based on the current state of the research, one must conclude that
there are no universal behaviors that reveal deceit. To the extent that
136. Gaze aversion figures prominently in the teaching materials used in police training. See
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 108, at 150-53. Gaze aversion was cited
by seventy-eight percent of the students tested and seventy-three percent of the professional lie
catchers. Aldert Vrij & Giin R. Semin, Lie Experts' Beliefs About Nonverbal Indicators of
Deception, 20 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 65, 70 (1996). Similar opinions were obtained by Miron
Zuckerman et al., Beliefs About Cues Associated with Deception, 6 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 105, 113
(1981).
137. Only thirty-three percent of prison inmates tested seemed to believe that gaze aversion
is related to deceit. Vrij & Semin, supra note 136, at 70. Prisoners' superior knowledge of deceit
cues was confirmed in a Swedish study. Par Anders Granhag et al., Imprisoned Knowledge:
Criminals'Beliefs about Deception, 9 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 103, 116 (2004).
138. Global Deception Research Team, A World of Lies, 37 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 60,
64-65 (2006). In a follow-up study conducted with 2,500 people in sixty-three countries, gaze
aversion was cited by 71.5 percent of the respondents, again, more than any other cue. Id. at 67-
68.
139. Two visual cues-pupil dilation and chin raise-were found to be positively related to
deceit, but they were observed in only four studies each. Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to
Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74,92 (2003).
140. For example, most people associate deceit with increased arm and leg movements, while
the research shows that these movements are actually inhibited during deceit. Akehurst et al.,
supra note 135, at 466.
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liars behave differently from truth-tellers, they do so in many diverse
and barely perceptible ways.
Yet, even assuming that a reliable and universal set of
diagnostic cues existed and that they were known to the observers,
accurate determinations of deceit would hardly be guaranteed. Given
limited attention, the observer cannot observe the entire panoply of
cues at once. Furthermore, she needs to discern the telling behavior
correctly (did I just see a twitch?), gauge its strength (how inconsistent
is that statement?), interpret it (are those finger movements indicative
of deceit or truth?), and integrate it with all the other cues into a
discrete judgment (I observed two cues, but innumerable others were
absent). People are not equipped with the explicit knowledge needed
to solve these quandaries, though it is possible that they perform this
task implicitly.
To test for this possibility of implicit judgments, studies have
been conducted to determine people's ability to distinguish between
truths and lies. A large meta-analysis summarizes data from 206
experiments and leads to a rather simple conclusion: people perform
poorly in distinguishing truthful from deceitful statements. Overall,
the mean percentage of accurate classifications is fifty-four percent.
The highest reported rate in any sample was seventy-three percent,
and the lowest was thirty-one percent. 141  These results are
statistically better than flipping a coin, but barely so. As Aldert Vrij
141. Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 219 (2006) [hereinafter Bond & DePaulo, Accuracy]. Put
differently, determinations of deceit were found to be correct fifty-six percent of the time, as were
fifty-four percent of the determinations of truth. This meta-analysis included results from 384
samples comprising of more than 24,000 judgments of deceit. A telling finding was made in a
Swedish study in which 125 participants judged a single witness (who was lying). About one half
of the observers (53.64 percent) judged him to be telling the truth, and the remainder (46.4
percent) reached the opposite conclusion. Par Anders Granhag & Leif A. Stromwall, Effects of
Preconceptions on Deception Detection and New Answers to Why Lie-Catchers Often Fail, 6
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 197, 206 (2000).
The conclusion that people lack the skill to detect lies is consistent with the finding that
individual differences in detection accuracy are minute. A meta-analysis shows that differences
in performance among individuals are no different from what would be expected by chance, and
that the highest levels of accuracy do not differ from what a stochastic mechanism would predict.
Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy
and Bias, 134 PSCYHOL. BULL. 477, 483, 485-87 (2008) [hereinafter Bond & DePaulo,
Differences]. A Swedish study found that inmates were somewhat more accurate in detecting
deceit than students (65.4 percent versus 57.7 percent). Their performance was superior in
accurately judging deceitful statements, but no better in judging truthful ones. Maria Hartwig,
Pir Anders Granhag, Leif A. Stromwall & Lars 0. Andersson, Suspicious Minds: Criminals'
Ability to Detect Deception, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 83, 88 (2004). For more on individual
differences, see Granhag & Strdmwall, supra note 141, at 213-16.
177
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
has pointed out, people are considerably better at telling lies than at
detecting them.142 Importantly, human performance on this task falls
well short of the levels of diagnosticity that warrant the dramatic
impact that a determination of deceit can have on a verdict.
This meta-analysis revealed also that detection accuracy is
contingent on the medium of the communication. Judgments based on
visual stimuli alone were found to be least accurate, while judgments
based on audio-visual presentations, audio recordings alone, and
transcripts share similar levels of accuracy. 143 This finding suggests
that visual cues might amount to a red herring that distracts
observers from concentrating on the more diagnostic information
embedded in the content of the statements and the para-verbal cues
emitted by the speaker. This observation is troubling in light of the
explicit instruction given to jurors to draw inferences from witnesses'
demeanor. The finding also throws into question the legal maxim that
immediate access to witnesses' courtroom demeanor makes jurors
uniquely positioned to determine credibility. As it turns out, appellate
judges should be able to perform just as well working off the trial
transcript.,
Applying the above-mentioned research to the realistic settings
is open to a serious objection. Much of the data was collected in the
laboratory, under conditions where most subjects had little incentive
to succeed in their tasks of deceiving or detecting deception. It is quite
possible that lies communicated to save one's freedom (or to cause
someone else to lose his) will have stronger behavioral manifestations
and thus be more decipherable by the observer. While the laboratory
setting does not afford the possibility of testing lies that have such
high stakes, some of the studies included in the meta-analysis did
incentivize participants to succeed in their attempted deceit, typically,
by offering monetary awards. Overall, the analysis shows that
incentives make only minor differences. 144 In fact, the research
142. ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2d ed.
2008).
143. Bond & DePaulo, Accuracy, supra note 141, at 225-26.
144. When looking only at studies that contained incentives, DePaulo and her colleagues
found four cues that were significantly diagnostic, only one of which (voice pitch) had a more
than minimal effect (a d value of 0.59, which is considered medium). DePaulo et al., supra note
139, at 97. In the meta-analysis by Sporer and Schwandt, the effect size for voice pitch was
r = .529, while the other three significant cues (message duration, speech rate and response
latency) were between 0.1 and 0.2 in high motivation settings. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer &
Barbara Schwandt, Paraverbal Indicators of Deception: A Meta-analytic Synthesis, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 421, 433-34 (2006).
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suggests that the motivation to be believed tends to increase
suspicious behaviors and thus reduces one's believability, regardless of
the truthfulness of the testimony. 145  Other cues, related to
nervousness, were observed in the subset of studies in which the
witness lied to cover up a transgression. 146 Notably, detectives and
students have fared poorly when trying to detect lies in realistic, high-
stake circumstances, including attempts by real-life murderers and
other guilty felons to escape prosecution.
147
The difficulties in detecting deceit are even more pronounced in
the courtroom setting. For one, nervousness might be less diagnostic
in the courtroom, where most witnesses-innocent defendants
perhaps more than others-are anxious to be believed by the jury.
Jurors might well misconstrue signs of nervousness as signs of deceit.
Another problem stems from the physical limitations of the courtroom.
Subtle facial cues, such as pupil dilation, are unlikely to be visible
from the distance that separates the witness and jury boxes. Other
cues cannot be observed absent special scientific instrumentation.
Notably, the effect of deceit on voice pitch amounts to a change of just
a few hertz, which is imperceptible to the naked ear.
148
The detection of deception in a criminal trial is further
hindered by the fact that jurors are presented with synthesized
testimony. Numerous pretrial occasions to practice their testimony
and to receive feedback provide witnesses with the opportunity to
improve their believability. There is good reason to believe that, over
the course of these renditions, the stories gravitate towards a better fit
with the extrinsic evidence and become embellished with details.
Rehearsing the testimony might also assist liars to overcome their
ambivalence and noncooperativeness, and to testify with fewer pauses
Notably, in this category of studies, gaze aversion was found to be significantly related to
deceit, though the relationship was unstable and weak. The effect size for gaze aversion,
measured in standardized difference (d), was -0.15. DePaulo et al., supra note 139, at 97.
145. Bond & DePaulo, Accuracy, supra note 141, at 226-27.
146. Deceit related to concealing a transgression appears to reveal more nervousness (d
0.51), blinking (d = 0.38), rate of speech (d = 0.32), and less foot and leg movement (d = -0.24).
Gaze aversion was nonsignificant in this group of studies. DePaulo et al., supra note 139, at 101.
147. Martha Davis et al., Judging the Credibility of Criminal Suspect Statements: Does Mode
of Presentation Matter?, 30 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 181, 193-94 (2006); Samantha Mann et al.,
Suspects, Lies, and Videotape: An Analysis of Authentic High-Stake Liars, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 365, 372 (2002) (finding that liars behave contrary to professional expectations); Aldert
Vrij & Samantha Mann, Who Killed My Relative? Police Officers' Ability to Detect Real-Life High-
Stake Lies, 7 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 119, 129 (2001) (finding that police officers were not able to
accurately detect lies even in high-stakes situations).
148. VRIJ, supra note 142, at 55.
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and shorter response latencies-all of which are deemed to be cues of
deception. 149 Indeed, the research shows that observers are less
accurate when judging prepared statements than when judging
unprepared ones.150 One study found that over the course of successive
interviews, deceitful witnesses' behavior became increasingly more
believable. 151
The inherent difficulty in detecting deceit makes this judgment
susceptible to biases and non-diagnostic features. One study found
that providing observers with positive (but irrelevant) information
about the witness increased the testimony's believability, while
negative information reduced it.152 Another study found that
witnesses who were judged to be friendly, likeable, and attractive were
also more likely to be believed, irrespective of the underlying
truthfulness of their statements.
153
The adverse effect of people's limited performance in detecting
deceit is compounded by their overconfidence. One analysis found that
participants believed that they were accurate seventy-three percent of
the time, while in reality their accuracy rate was fifty-seven percent. A
meta-analysis of eighteen studies found a confidence-accuracy
relationship that was very close to zero, which means that confident
judgments were no more accurate than doubtful ones.15 4 Moreover,
observers' confidence is likely to be inflated by group deliberation,
with no appreciable improvement in accuracy.155
F. False Corroboration
The assessment of evidence is hindered also by systemic
problems with the evidence produced at trial. One such issue stems
from the widespread reliance on corroboration. A ubiquitous cue for
149. DePaulo et al. supra note 139, at 75.
150. Bond & DePaulo, Accuracy, supra note 141, at 227.
151. Par Anders Granhag & Leif A. Stromwall, Repeated Interrogations: Verbal and Non-
verbal Cues to Deception, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 243, 254 (2002).
152. Granhag & Stromwall, supra note 141, at 214.
153. Maureen O'Sullivan, The Fundamental Attribution Error in Detecting Deception: The
Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1316, 1319, 1324 (2003).
154. A meta-analysis of eighteen studies found the confidence-accuracy relationship to be
minute and not statistically significant (r = 0.04). Across the studies, the correlations ranged
from -0.20 to 0.26. Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection
of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 349, 351, 353 (1997).
155. Mark G. Frank et al., Individual and Small Group Accuracy in Judging Truthful and
Deceptive Communication, 13 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 45, 53-54 (2004); Ernest S. Park
et al., Group and Individual Accuracy in Deception Detection, 19 COMM. RES. REP. 99, 103 (2002).
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drawing inferences is the volume of the evidence items that support
the conclusion and the interrelationship among them. In principle, the
larger the number of items and the stronger they corroborate one
another, the more they are deemed to support the conclusion. In
practice, however, corroboration can be misleading. In the normal
course of an investigation, each lead follows and builds upon the
already collected evidence, until a sufficient accumulation of items
converges on the investigative conclusion. When the initial evidence
item is erroneous, it can set off an escalation of error that sweeps
through the entire investigation. 156 The escalation is facilitated by the
fact that investigative procedures are capable of actually inducing
errors, which invariably cohere with and compound the extant
mistaken evidence. 15 7 Escalations are oftentimes exacerbated by the
police's commitment to the initial course of action taken.158 This sense
of commitment is particularly strong after the suspect has been
named and taken into custody, which is when the bulk of the
investigative work is performed.
159
When the evidence items are not truly independent of one
another, they create a false sense of corroboration. In other words, a
full-bodied set of inculpatory evidence can be a misleading artifact of
the investigative process. Indeed, in a number of known wrongful
convictions, the case presented to the jury consisted of strongly
corroborating evidence, all of which turned out to have been false.
160
The availability of corroborating evidence might help explain why
fewer than half of DNA exonerees even raised a claim contesting the
sufficiency of evidence. 16' Albeit wrong, the evidence in these cases
appeared to be compelling to appellate judges, as only one of the sixty
innocent convicts received relief on this ground.
1 62
156. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
157. See SIMON, supra note 9, chs. 3-5.
158. See SIMON, supra note 9, ch. 2.
159. NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE
74 (Wesley G. Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).
160. For illustration, a capital prosecution of an innocent Maryland man included
identifications by five eyewitnesses, a shoe impression, and a putatively incriminating statement
made by the defendant, all leading the prosecutor to describe the evidence as being "extremely
strong." SCHECK ET AL., supra note 116, at 222. For more on this investigation and trial of Kirk
Bloodsworth, see TIM JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH 39, 85-86, 136-37 (2004).
161. These data pertain to the 133 DNA exonerations with written opinions (taken from the
first 200 DNA exonerations). Garrett, supra note 24, at 96.
162. Id. at 112.
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G. Investigation Opacity
Another systemic problem that hinders the assessment of
evidence is that factfinders are largely uninformed, or ill-informed,
about the manner in which the evidence was collected. As mentioned,
one of the distinctive features of criminal investigations is that
erroneous testimony can be induced by the investigative procedures
themselves. Notably, misidentifications can be caused by poorly
performed lineups, event memory errors can be triggered by
suggestive questioning, and false confessions can be generated by
investigative tactics. 163 Factfinders would gain much by being able to
compare witnesses' courtroom testimony with the exact statements
they initially gave the police. It would also be helpful to provide
factfinders with a complete record of the investigative procedures used
to elicit their testimony, such as the precise manner in which the
lineup was conducted, the verbatim wording of the interview, and the
pressures applied in the interrogation room.
This information is typically unavailable to the factfinder, as
the investigative process is rarely recorded. By their own admission,
thirty-three percent of lineup administrators fail to keep any written
reports of the lineups, and twenty-seven percent do not bother to keep
a photographic record of the procedures. 164 Indeed, in about one-half of
the eyewitness identification cases that have reached the Supreme
Court, the Court noted the incompleteness of the record of the
procedure (yet invariably upheld the identifications with little concern
for the missing information). 165 Due to the limitations of memory,
recalling every detail from a comprehensive investigation is simply
impossible. The research shows that investigators forget much of the
relevant information before the interview is over, 16 6 and there is little
163. See SIMON, supra note 9, chs. 2-5.
164. Michael S. Wogalter et al., A National Survey of US Police on Preparation and Conduct
of Identification Lineups, 10 PSCYHOL. CRIME & L. 69, 74 (2004).
165. Incomplete records were mentioned in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 n.8
(1973), Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 200 (1972), Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 26 (1970)
(Powell, J., dissenting), Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 388 n.9 (1968), Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 270 (1967), Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), and
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350 (1981).
166. Professional child abuse interviewers in a real-life study failed to recall one-quarter of
the details reported by the witnesses and more than half of the questions they asked, even when
taking contemporaneous verbatim notes during the interview. Michael E. Lamb et al., Accuracy
of Investigators' Verbatim Notes of Their Forensic Interviews with Alleged Child Abuse Victims,
24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 699, 704-05 (2000). Likewise, experienced forensic and child protective
interviewers recalled twenty-two percent of the questions they asked in a simulated interview.
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reason to believe that witnesses will remember much more. This is
particularly true when the inducing influences are conveyed by means
of barely noticeable communications, such as slight variations in the
instructions given at the lineup or subtle phraseology of questions.
Still, detectives routinely testify about investigative
procedures, oftentimes in great detail. The concern is that this
testimony is likely to be wanting due to the detectives' limited memory
of the precise details, and to be skewed by the motivation to depict
one's investigative work as professional and trustworthy. On the
stand, detectives habitually deny influencing the witnesses' responses.
In some instances, the denials are genuine, because the detective did
not engage in any behavior that would induce error, was not aware
that her conduct influenced the witness's response, or had simply
forgotten what exactly she said or did. In other cases, detectives lie
outright about their conduct, a practice known as testilying.
167
Regardless of the source of the detective's denial, it regularly
contradicts the defendant's account. This happens most frequently in
the context of interrogations which, despite their potential impact on
the verdict, are one of the most obscure facets of the investigatory
process. With no verifiable record in hand, these contradictory
testimonies turn into swearing contests between police officers and
defendants. Usually, the former come out ahead.
The unavailability of the investigative record deprives jurors of
a valuable means of ascertaining the accuracy of testimony. With only
incomplete and oftentimes biased information at their disposal, jurors
are left with little choice but to trust or distrust the evidence blindly,
or resort to superficial and often misleading features, such as the
witness's confidence and demeanor.
Amye R. Warren et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of a Training Program for Interviewing Child
Witnesses, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 128 (1999).
167. The term "testilying" was coined by officers who were involved in committing perjury.
CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994); see also
Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
1037, 1040 (1996) (noting the ubiquity of testilying). Renowned criminologist Jerome Skolnick
observes that for the police, 'lying is a routine way of managing legal impediments-whether to
protect fellow officers or to compensate for what [the officer] views as limitations the courts have
placed on his capacity to deal with criminals." Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 40, 43 (1982).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
II. NON-EVIDENTIAL INFLUENCES
The preceding Part of this Article examined how the
determination of the facts can be hindered by difficulties in drawing
inferences from the testimony that is commonly presented at criminal
trials. This Part focuses on non-evidential aspects of the adjudicatory
process that compound these difficulties and pose additional threats to
the integrity of criminal verdicts.
Deciding criminal verdicts in difficult cases can be a most
taxing mental task, and the courtroom is hardly the ideal environment
for rational, astute, levelheaded decisionmaking. Jurors are presented
with a cacophony of ambiguous, conflicting, and incommensurable
evidence, all driven through the polarizing force fields of adversarial
advocacy. The evidence consists of unknown quantities of truth,
errors, exaggerations, red herrings, and outright lies. Throughout the
process, skilled attorneys inform, woo, and sometimes manipulate
jurors, appealing to them with a panoply of persuasive efforts, rational
and otherwise. The entire experience is often steeped in emotional
pulls such as empathy and sadness, and sometimes also disgust,
disdain, and vengefulness. Having to decide criminal verdicts in
contested cases can be a source of stress for jurors.
168
The law's concomitant commitment to rational inferences and
its susceptibility to biasing influences evoke a body of research on
dual-process theories, which distinguish between two general types of
cognitive processing. The loose assortment of processes dubbed System
I are typically holistic, associationistic, crude, and superficial. They
are often driven by emotion, motivation, affect, effort-minimization,
and closure-seeking. System II processing is purportedly analytical,
thorough, and rational. 169 While some researchers have maintained
that the systems operate mostly separately from one another, 170 or
168. Brian H. Bornstein et al., Juror Reactions to Jury Duty: Perceptions of the System and
Potential Stressors, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 321, 322, 331-32 (2005).
169. KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO IS RATIONAL?: STUDIES OF INDIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
REASONING 144-45 (1999); Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic
Unconscious, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 711 (1994); Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly about
Others: Automatic Components of the Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189,
190 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for
Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 4-6 (1996).
170. Robert Abelson stated that "the reasoner and the inferencer don't talk much to each
other." Robert P. Abelson, The Reasoner and the Inferencer Don't Talk Much to Each Other, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1975 WORKSHOP ON THEORETICAL ISSUES IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING 3, 3 (1975). One view suggests that the two systems operate mostly in parallel.
Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory: An Integrative Theory of Personality, in
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that System 11 corrects and overrides System 1,171 the emerging view is
that the operations of the two systems are not so distinct. In
particular, System I processing can play a decisive role in System II
processing. 172 In other words, analytic thinking is susceptible to being
skewed by superficial heuristic processing.
173
In the context of deciding criminal trials, the concern is that
the avowed rational drawing of inferences will be swayed by a variety
of biasing factors. As the biasing factors are generally unrelated to the
defendant's actual guilt, any influence they bear on the verdict has the
potential to distort the case's outcome. There is good reason to believe
that competent attorneys are familiar with the biasing potential of
these factors, even if implicitly so. These factors are routinely
deployed by dueling attorneys in the hope of winning the adversarial
contest. Cases that lend themselves to inculpating System I factors are
more likely to command a harsh plea bargain, and, if tried, are most
likely to be won. By the same token, cases that lend themselves to
exculpating System I factors are more likely to be dismissed or to
result in acquittal, again, irrespective of the defendant's guilt.
Both experimental and archival data show that decisions are
least susceptible to biasing factors when the evidence is strong, one
way or the other. The process becomes most vulnerable to bias when
the decision is close, that is, when the evidence does not afford a clear
determination of the facts. 174 Many cases that go to trial lack such
clarity.
THE RELATIONAL SELF: THEORETICAL CONVERGENCES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 111, 124 (Rebecca C. Curtis ed., 1991).
171. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic Judgment, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 267, 286-87 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G.
Morrison eds., 2005).
172. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social
Cognition, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255, 258 (2008).
173. For example, stereotyping has been found to affect not only superficial judgments, but
also ones that require deeper thinking. Duane T. Wegener et al., Not All Stereotyping Is Created
Equal: Differential Consequences of Thoughtful Versus Nonthoughtful Stereotyping, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 42, 50 (2006).
174. The 'liberation hypothesis" suggests that only when the evidence is closely balanced, do
jurors feel free to insert their values and beliefs into their verdicts. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164-66 (1966) (discussing the liberation hypothesis). The
particular sensitivity of close cases has been replicated in numerous other studies. For
experimental data, see Brewer & Hupfeld, supra note 77 (providing empirical research on jury
decisionmaking); James D. Johnson, Erik Whitestone, Lee Anderson Jackson & Leslie Gatto,
Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence,
21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893, 895-96 (1995) (studying jury impressions of
defendants of different races).
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A. Courtroom Persuasion
At bottom, the trial consists of attorneys' attempts at
persuading factfinders to believe and endorse their side of the case. As
such, litigation is an inescapably persuasive endeavor. According to a
prominent dual-process theory of persuasion, people can be convinced
by means of the central route of persuasion, which resembles System
II processing. This method emphasizes systematic and deliberative
communication, and it relies on the presentation of facts and
rationally drawn inferences. Alternatively, people can be persuaded
through heuristic routes, which map onto System I processing. These
methods of persuasion include superficial associations, similarities,
metaphors, emotional appeals, and narratives. 175 The research
indicates that persuasion can be dominated by heuristic modes of
communication, which means that factfinders stand to be persuaded
by superficial cues rather than by analytic inferences drawn from the
evidence. 176
The most ubiquitous form of persuasion is storytelling.
Narratives, more so than isolated facts, have the power to mentally
transport the audience, temporarily altering their normal emotional
and cognitive reactions to the information presented. By partly
neutralizing the recipients' critical evaluation, the storyteller makes
possible the acceptance of accounts that might otherwise have been
rejected. 177 A series of studies by Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie
shows that jurors naturally fit trial information into story-like
formats. People are found to make sense of complicated evidence sets
by constructing narratives that are formed around intuitive and
familiar schemas or scripts of human action.178 Thus, evidence that
175. See, e.g., Serena Chen & Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic-Systematic Model in Its Broader
Context, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73, 89 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov
Trope eds., 1999) (discussing superficial associations); see also RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T.
CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE
CHANGE (1986) (discussing other factors of persuasion such as repetition of arguments, rhetorical
questions, and arguer expertise).
176. Shelly Chaiken et al., Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing Within and
Beyond the Persuasion Context, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT, supra note 169, at 219-20.
177. Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, In the Mind's Eye Transportation-Imagery Model
of Narrative Persuasion, in NARRATIVE IMPACT: SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS 315, 334-
35 (Melanie C. Green et al. eds., 2002).
178. Of the possible stories that could plausibly be constructed from the trial evidence, jurors
tend to adopt the strongest narrative, as determined by its coverage of the known facts, internal
consistency, correspondence with background knowledge, and its structural fit with familiar
narratives structures. For a review, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for
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lends itself to the story format is more likely to be presented at trial
and to convince a jury.179  There is nothing inherently
counternormative about the impact of narratives on courtroom
persuasion, nor could one imagine how evidence would be presented
without resorting to a narrative of one sort or another. There is also
reason to believe that, in reality, truthful evidence is more likely to
produce a good narrative than untruthful evidence. Still, there is a
danger that factual inferences will be swamped by the narrative force
of a case, as well as by the persuasiveness of the witnesses and
attorneys who deliver it.
There are more serious concerns than mere storytelling.
Research shows that persuasion is affected by a host of heuristic
routes to persuasion, such as the use of emotional appeals,'
80
metaphors, 181 irony,182 rhetorical questions, 18 3  and humor and
ridicule. 184 Persuasion is affected also by the listeners' characteristics,
such as attitudes and group membership,
8 5 their affective states, 86
and confidence. 8 7 People have been found to place greater weight on
anecdotal and personal experiences than on more reliable sources of
Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192,
195 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). The story model was preceded by W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 41-65 (1981); see also WILLEM ALBERT WAGENAAR ET AL., ANCHORED
NARRATIVES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 55-57 (1993) (providing statistical and
anecdotal evidence of the persuasive power of stories on jury decisionmaking).
179. This is not to say that the story model is entirely a construct of persuasion. Pennington
and Hastie's research demonstrates that people apply the story format intrapersonally, as an
adaptive cognitive tool to enable the handling of complex evidence sets. Pennington & Hastie,
supra note 178, at 194.
180. William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin, Attitudes and Persuasion, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
345, 357, 359 (2006).
181. Pradeep Sopory & James Price Dillard, The Persuasive Effects of Metaphor: A Meta-
analysis, 28 HUM. COMM. RES. 382,404 (2002).
182. Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. & Christin D. Izett, Irony as Persuasive Communication, in
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES 131, 138-44
(Herbert L. Colston & Albert N. Katz eds., 2005).
183. David R. Roskos-Ewoldsen, What Is the Role of Rhetorical Questions in Persuasion?, in
COMMUNICATION AND EMOTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DOLF ZILLMANN 297, 298-99 (Jennings
Bryant et al. eds., 2003).
184. Pamela Hobbs, Lawyers' Use of Humor as Persuasion, 20 HUMOR: IN'L J. HUMOR RES.
123 passim (2007).
185. Wendy Wood, Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
539, 557-58 (2000).
186. Richard E. Petty et al., Attitudes and Attitude Change, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 609, 625
(1997).
187. Richard E. Petty et al., Thought Confidence as a Determinant of Persuasion: The Self-
Validation Hypothesis, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 722, 727 (2002).
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information.'8 8 People are also affected by the medium through which
visual information is communicated, such as video, color photography,
or text, 8 9 as well as by the likeability of the speaker.190
It is hardly surprising to find that adversarial attorneys are
tempted to put these heuristic forms of persuasion to use. A brief
glance at conventional trial advocacy manuals and professional
education materials reveals how seriously lawyers take heuristic
persuasion. For illustration, lawyers are advised to dress properly,
maintain an appearance of absolute sincerity, entertain the jurors, tell
them a story, be brief, keep a distance from the jury box, and,
tellingly, not sound like a lawyer. 191 Another manual instructs lawyers
to "be good," appear confident, maintain eye contact with the jury,
dress to suit the jury's taste, and vary the tone, volume, and
modulation of speech. 192 Titles of mainstream training manuals
include Theater Tips and Strategies for Jury Trials and What Can
Lawyers Learn From Actors? 93 Some lawyers undergo therapy in the
hope of connecting better with jurors. 194 The potential for exploiting
heuristic persuasion is one of the driving forces behind the emergence
of the trial consulting industry. The trade association's July 2008
newsletter offered lawyers advice on courtroom techniques, such as
188. Eugene Borgida & Richard E. Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete
Information on Decisions, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 268 (1977). In a study testing a tort
case, jurors were about twice as likely to find for the plaintiff when the defense's expert witness
presented scientific data as compared to anecdotes (fifty-nine percent versus thirty-one percent).
Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientific Testimony on Mock Jurors'
Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 429, 434-35 (2004).
189. In a simulated tort case, jurors awarded higher damages for a bodily injury when it was
depicted in color photographs than in black and white photographs or in text form. Denise H.
Whalen & Fletcher A. Blanchard, Effects of Photographic Evidence on Mock Juror Judgement, 12
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 30, 38 (1982).
190. Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1443, 1450-53 (1978).
191. KEITH EVANS, THE COMMON SENSE RULES OF TRIAL ADVOCACY, 13-15, 20-21, 46-48, 54,
60 (1994).
192. ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL: ADVOCACY BEFORE JUDGES, JURORS, AND
ARBITRATORS 18-19 (3d ed. 2004).
193. These manuals are published by The National Institute for Trial Advocacy ("NITA").
NITA is a well-regarded, 501(c)(3) charitable organization whose primary mission is to "promote
justice through effective and ethical advocacy." Mission Statement, NITA, http://www.nita.org
/page.asp?id=2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
194. For example, workshops in the group therapy technique of psychodrama have been
designed for lawyers. While the promoters of the workshops claim that it helps attorneys become
better people, proponents also contend that it could help them persuade juries. Jessica Garrison,
Lawyers Tap Their Feelings to Connect with Jurors: Attorneys Use a Technique Called
Psychodrama to Learn to Win a Jury's Sympathy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, at B1.
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developing easy and memorable themes, preparing compelling visual
aids, and using religion effectively in the courtroom.
195
B. Exposure to Impermissible Information
A key feature of the Anglo-American trial is that the verdict
ought to be based on the evidence admitted at trial. Information that
was not admitted as evidence ought not to affect the decision. 196 This
expectation might be jeopardized by the fact that jurors are often
exposed to extra-evidential information. This information often comes
from media reports, most of which originate from the police, but it can
also stem from questioning during jury selection, utterances by
witnesses, statements by lawyers, or courtroom gossip.
The potential effect of pretrial publicity has been observed in
the laboratory as well as in the field. Field studies have found that
prospective jurors' belief in the defendants' guilt was positively related
to their exposure to information about the cases.' 91 The study of 179
Indiana trials revealed a significant correlation between exposure to
pretrial publicity and the verdicts rendered. 98 The presence and
impact of pretrial publicity is bound to be strongest in high profile
crimes, especially in small communities. In one notable case, a poll
conducted by an Oklahoma City television station found that before
any evidence was presented in court against a murder suspect, sixty-
eight percent of the viewers voted that he was guilty. The defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death, only to be exonerated by DNA
ten years later. 199
195. THE JURY EXPERT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF LITIGATION ADVOCACY (July 2008),
available at http://www.astcweb.org/public/publication/issue.cfm/July/2008/
2 0/ 2 /1 6 .
196. Jurors are instructed to that effect. For example, the California pattern instructions
state, "You must use only the evidence that is presented in the courtroom." JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CAL. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 104 (2010).
197. Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 21 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 354, 359 (1991); Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay,
Psychologists as Consultants for Changes of Venue: The Use of Public Opinion Surveys, 7 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 309, 321 (1983).
198. The correlation between exposure to media reports and guilty verdicts was 0.26.
Consistent with the liberation hypothesis, the correlation was 0.39 for the cases in which the
strength of evidence was intermediate Dennis J. Devine et al., Strength of Evidence,
Extraevidentiary Influence, and the Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 136, 142 (2009).
199. Ten years after Robert Miller was convicted and sentenced to death, he was exonerated
by a DNA test that exculpated him and identified the true perpetrator. SCHECK ET AL., supra
note 116, at 78-87, 92-106; Robert Miller, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/ContentfRobertMiller.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
189
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Experimental research indicates that extra-evidential
information can readily seep into the decisionmaking process and
sway the verdict. Conviction rates have been found to rise after jurors
have been exposed to inadmissible newspaper items that linked a
defendant's gun to the murder,200 reported on the defendant's prior
suspicious conduct, 20' described the suspect as a friendless bully,
20 2
and provided information about an argument between the defendant
and the victim on the day of her death.20 3 A meta-analysis of forty-four
empirical tests involving more than 5,000 participants resulted in an
overall increase of conviction rate of sixteen percent due to pretrial
publicity. The effects are strongest in studies conducted under more
realistic conditions. 20 4 Presenting extra-evidential information in a
graphical manner (on video) led to stronger biasing effects than less
graphic presentations (in print).
20 5
One explanation for the impact of pretrial publicity is that
jurors cannot always recall whether a particular fact was presented at
trial or was conveyed by an extra-evidential source. 206 Another
explanation is that, in striving to reach a result that seems just, jurors
use any information they deem probative, regardless of whether it was
admitted into evidence. In some instances, judges seek to counter the
effects of pretrial publicity by instructing the jurors to ignore it. The
200. The exposure to the news item resulted in an increase in the rate of convictions from
thirty-nine percent to forty-six percent. Stanley Sue et al., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on
Judicial Decisions, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 163, 169 (1974).
201. The predeliberation rates of conviction on the two cases rose from fifty-seven percent to
sixty-five percent and from thirty-four percent to forty-two percent, respectively. Norbert L. Kerr,
Keith E. Niedermeier & Martin F. Kaplan, Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence from
the SDS Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 77-78 (1999).
202. The rates of conviction rose from fifty-six percent to seventy-three percent. Lorraine
Hope et al., Understanding Pretrial Publicity: Predecisional Distortion of Evidence by Mock
Jurors, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 113, 115 (2004).
203. The rates of conviction rose from thirty-seven percent to sixty-three percent. Christine
Ruva et al., Effects of Pre-trial Publicity and Jury Deliberation on Juror Bias and Source Memory
Errors, 21 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 45, 53, 58, 65 (2007). A subsequent study using the same
materials resulted in similar conviction rates (thirty-eight percent and seventy percent,
respectively). Christine L. Ruva & Cathy McEvoy, Negative and Positive Pretrial Publicity Affect
Juror Memory and Decision Making, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 226, 231 (2008).
204. Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A
Meta-analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 219, 223, 229 (1999).
205. James R. P. Ogloff & Neil Vidmar, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors: A Study
to Compare the Relative Effects of Television and Print Media in a Child Sex Abuse Case, 18 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 507, 507 (1994).
206. Ruva et al., supra note 203, at 46. On issues surrounding the monitoring of the source of
one's memories, see Mitchell & Johnson, Source Monitoring: Attributing Mental Experiences, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEMORY, supra note 82, at 184-85.
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effectiveness of these admonitions has been challenged by a sizeable
body of experimental research.
20 7
C. Emotional Arousal
The tension between the law's aspiration to analytical
processing of evidence and the potential biasing effects of System I
factors is perhaps most pronounced when it comes to making decisions
that are emotionally charged. 208 Given the ubiquity and inextricability
of emotion in everyday judgments, it would be impractical and
arguably inadvisable to try to rid the decisionmaking of all emotion.
The situation gets more complicated when it comes to intense
emotions. Heinous crimes, for example, tend to arouse high levels of
anger, disgust, outrage, and indignation. 20 9  Social-psychological
studies find that the arousal of anger bears profound effects on
judgments of other people. Angry observers are more likely to
attribute blame to the person being judged, to perceive her conduct as
intentional, to lower the required threshold of evidence, and to neglect
alternative explanations and mitigating circumstances. 210 Anger has
also been found to increase the reliance on stereotypes, 211 the desire
207. Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard
Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (2006). For a review,
see SIMON, supra note 9, ch. 7.
208. The legal system is well aware of the susceptibility of jury verdicts to emotional arousal,
and jurors are routinely instructed not be overtaken by it. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 196, at 101 ("Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or
public opinion influence your decision.").
209. Exposing people to gruesome images has been found to be strongly arousing. Noelle
Robertson et al., Vicarious Traumatisation as a Consequence of Jury Service, 48 HOw. J. CRIM.
JUST. 1, 1 (2009). On the relationship among these emotional reactions, see Daniel Kahneman &
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognitive Psychology of Moral Intuitions, in NEUROBIOLOGY OF HUMAN
VALUES 91, 91-103 (J.-P. Changeux et al. eds., 2005).
210. Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor, 29
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 781, 782 (1999); Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The
Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 563 (1998); Brian M. Quigley & James T. Tedeschi,
Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1280, 1280 (1996). Anger was also found to mediate judgments of blame in apportioning
responsibility for accidents. Neal Feigenson et al., The Role of Emotions in Comparative
Negligence Judgments, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 576, 576 (2001).
211. For example, arousal of anger increased participants' tendency to believe an allegation
that a Hispanic person behaved violently and that a student athlete cheated on an exam. Galen
V. Bodenhausen et al., Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger
and Sadness, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 45, 45, 50 (1994).
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for retaliation, 212 and the motivation to take action to remedy the
transgression. 213 It is important to note that anger is a mood state,
and its effects are not readily containable. In these studies, the state
of anger affected judgments of people who were not related in any way
to the event that triggered the anger.
The effects of anger were found also in studies that simulated
legal decisionmaking. One study found that presenting simulated
jurors with gruesome photographs of a stabbed murder victim led to
an arousal of negative emotions-including feeling anxious,
anguished, disturbed, and shocked-which resulted in a doubling of
the conviction rate.214 Similar findings were made in studies that
contained presentations of severe brutality and mutilation.
21 5
Importantly, in these studies, the issue in question was the identity of
the perpetrator, which means that the heinousness of the act was
entirely irrelevant and nondiagnostic to deciding the verdict. 216 In
evidence law terminology, the heinous evidence bore a strong
prejudicial effect while providing no probative value. 21 7 Gruesome
212. Tamara J. Ferguson & Brendan Gail Rule, An Attributional Perspective on Anger and
Aggression, in AGGRESSION: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEWS 41, 44 (RUSSELL G. GEEN & I.
DONNERSTEIN eds., 1983).
213. Diane M. Mackie et al., Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in
an Intergroup Context, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 602, 602 (2000). Judgments of social
situations can be affected also by other emotions. For the emotional effects of victim impact
statements, see Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 422 (2003).
214. Kevin S. Douglas et al., The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors'
Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 485, 492
(1997).
215. In one study, exposure to gruesome evidence increased the conviction rate from 14
percent to 34 percent. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, The Influence of Gruesome
Verbal Evidence on Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 154, 154 (2004); see also
David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame,
and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 183 (2006) (finding that exposure to
gruesome photographs increased anger at the defendant as well as the conviction rate). Other
studies, however, have provided only partial support for the effect of gruesome evidence. See Saul
M. Kassin & David A. Garfield, Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Videotaped
Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1459, 1459 (1991) (finding that
gruesome evidence affected juries in different ways, and produced an overall prejudice in a trial).
216. Anger can play a legitimate role in sentencing decisions. Various homicide statutes
recognize heinousness as a factor that can aggravate a homicide to a first degree murder, and
even to a capital murder. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(h)(i)(5) (2010) (including
"heinous" nature of crime as an aggravating factor in sentencing of capital cases).
217. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (authorizing the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect).
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Another threat to the integrity of the factfinding process stems
from reliance on racial stereotypes. Given that prejudiced groups are
subject to discrimination in various walks of life,219 it would not be
surprising to find that they were also treated disparately by the
criminal justice system. The research shows that racial bias influences
conviction rates when the crime charged is typical of the stereotype of
the defendant's group. For example, white defendants are more likely
to be found guilty than black defendants for embezzlement, but the
reverse is true for auto theft and burglary. The research shows that
the congruence between the crime and the stereotype leads to more
superficial and confirmatory searches for information regarding the
defendant's guilt, to attributions of the criminal behavior to the
internal personality of the defendant, and to higher predictions of
future criminal behavior.
220
These experimental results are consistent with data from the
DNA exonerations, which come predominantly from convictions for
rape, perhaps the most stereotypical of crimes. While seventy-three
percent of the first 200 DNA exonerees convicted for rape were
minorities, the overall proportion of minorities amongst people
218. For example, in the closing arguments in Darryl Hunt's second trial, prosecutor Dean
Bowman brought some jurors to tears when describing how the victim of the rape-murder must
have felt with the "thick yellow sickening fluid in her body? ... Did she feel the life inside just
trickle right out of her body right there on the grass?" Zerwick, supra note 22, pt. 6.
219. For illustration of discrimination in employment, see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004) (finding that
differential treatment by race seems to remain prevalent in the U.S. labor market). For
illustrations of discrimination in organ transplants and car purchasing, see IAN AYRES,
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DIsCRIMINATION 38-
39, 174-75 (2003).
220. Randall A. Gordon, Attributions for Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effects of
Subject and Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 971, 971
(1990); Randall A. Gordon et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of
Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 191 (1988); Christopher
S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes on Juror Decision-
Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2003).
Stereotype effects were observed in judgments of gay defendants accused of molestation and
Hispanic defendants accused of assault. Galen V. Bodenhausen, Second-Guessing the Jury:
Stereotypic and Hindsight Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1112, 1112, 1155 (1990).
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convicted for rape is about half of that.221 This pattern is particularly
pronounced in cases where the victims are white. Although only fewer
than one in six rapes perpetrated against white women are committed
by black men,222 almost half of the people exonerated of rape by DNA
testing were convicted for cross-racial rape, mostly black men charged
with assaulting white women.
223
Racial effects are observed also in the meting out of
punishments, especially in the context of death sentencing. Archival
data show that black defendants who killed white victims are more
likely to be sentenced to death than any other racial combination.
224 It
is also noteworthy that some black defendants are punished more
harshly than others. Specifically, experiments show that black
defendants with distinct Afrocentric facial features-notably, a broad
nose, thick lips, and dark skin-are judged more harshly than black
people who appear less stereotypically African.225 This finding is
221. Garrett, supra note 24, at 96.
222. Of the 194,270 rapes reported by white victims in 2006, the race of the offender was
known in 82.8 percent of the reports. Of these instances, 16.7 percent were perpetrated by black
men. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 2006, tbl.42, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflcvus0602.pdf.
223. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200 EXONERATED: Too MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 20-21
(2007), available at http:I/www.innocenceproject.org/200ip-200.pdf. To be sure, these disparities
cannot be attributed entirely to the decisionmaking process, as they could be caused by factors
relating to the testimony-such as the cross-race effect in eyewitness identification-as well as
by prosecutorial discretion. It is doubtful whether the cross-race effect can explain this marked
disproportion. Note that a similar racial disproportion is observed in capital sentencing
(discussed below), where eyewitness identification plays only a minor role. The similarity
between these two domains suggests that racial prejudice affects the criminal justice process in
deeper ways including, possibly, by skewing juries' determinations of guilt for minorities for
stereotypically congruent crimes.
224. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 173, 183 (1990) (finding generally that black defendants are more often
given the death penalty than white defendants); John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's
Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 165, 204 (2004) (finding
that facial features are one factor in the higher proportion of black inmates on death row).
225. For laboratory findings, see Irene V. Blair et al., The Role of Afrocentric Features in
Person Perception: Judging by Features and Categories, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5
(2002); Irene V. Blair et al., The Use of Afrocentric Features as Cues for Judgment in the Presence
of Diagnostic Information, 35 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 59 (2005).
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manifested in archival data of prison sentencing,226 and even in death
penalty sentencing.
227
E. The Coherence Effect
One of the distinctive features of difficult cases is that they
entail drawing inferences from multiple evidence items, all of which
need to be integrated into a singular factual assessment and converted
into a binary verdict choice. This task is no light matter given the
sheer volume, uncertainty, incommensurability, and conflict among of
the evidence presented. For illustration, an analysis of the evidence
presented in the trial of Sacco and Vanzetti identified more than 300
facts and propositions.2
28
The integration of evidence in complex decision tasks is the
subject of a body of research on the coherence effect. This basic
psychological research program can be encapsulated by the Gestaltian
notion that what goes together, must fit together. The research
indicates that decisions are made effectively and comfortably when
they are derived from coherent mental models of the case at hand.229 A
mental model is deemed coherent when the conclusion is strongly
supported by the bulk of the evidence, with only weak evidence or
none at all supporting the contrary conclusion.230 The cognitive system
226. A study of a sample of 216 Florida convicted inmates revealed that those whose
appearance was one standard deviation above the group mean measure of Afrocentric features
received sentences that were seven to eight months longer than inmates with one standard
deviation below the mean. Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in
Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. Scd. 674, 674-75, 678 (2004).
227. Among the forty-four Philadelphia cases where black defendants were convicted for
capital murder of a white victim, twenty-four percent of defendants classified as having low
Afrocentric features were sentenced to death, whereas the rate was fifty-seven percent for
defendants who had a strong stereotypical look. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383, 384 (2006).
228. According to this count, the prosecution's case contained 139 evidence items and the
defense's case comprised of 199. JOSEPH B. KADANE & DAVID A. SCHUM, A PROBABILISTIC
ANALYSIS OF THE SACCO AND VANZETTI CASE 80, 286-337 (1996).
229. The term "mental model" is used here in the broad sense of a structured representation.
See ARTHUR B. MARKMAN, KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 248-50 (1999) (examining theories and
uses of mental models).
230. "Coherence-based reasoning" is grounded in the cognitive architecture of Parallel
Constraint Satisfaction, which was developed to explain mental processing involved in vision.
The seminal work on constraint satisfaction theories is DAVID E. RUMELHART & JAMES L.
MCCLELLAND, PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING: EXPLORATIONS IN THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF
COGNITION (1986). For an introduction to connectionism, see PAUL T-AGARD, COHERENCE IN
THOUGHT AND ACTION 30-32 (2000) (explaining how to translate a coherence problem into a
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stamps out complexity and decisional conflict by imposing coherence
on the mental model of the task. Over the course of the
decisionmaking process, the mental representation of the facts
undergoes gradual change, from the initial state of complexity towards
an ultimate state of coherence with the emerging conclusion. As the
conclusion emerges-whether conviction or acquittal-the
decisionmaker experiences the supporting evidence as stronger and
more probative, while the contrary evidence wanes. The generation of
coherence is driven by a bidirectional process of reasoning: just as the
facts guide the choice of the preferred conclusion, the emergence of
that conclusion radiates backwards and reshapes the facts to become
more coherent with it. These coherence shifts, which occur primarily
beneath the level of conscious awareness, serve to spread apart the
available conclusions, leading to the dominance of one conclusion over
the other, thus enabling a confident decision. 231 While this effect is
adaptive, it must be appreciated that the forcefulness of the evidence
sets on which decisions are made is, to some degree, an artifact of the
cognitive system rather than an objective assessment of the case at
hand. In other words, successful decisionmaking entails a certain
distortion of the evidence.
One important feature of the coherent effect is the spreading
apart of the mental model of the case, that is, the bolstering of the
evidence that supports one verdict and the weakening of the evidence
that supports the opposite verdict. This polarization has the potential
problem that can be solved in a connectionist network). For an excellent review, see Stephen J.
Read et al., Connectionism, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Processes, and Gestalt Principles:
(Re)Introducing Cognitive Dynamics to Social Psychology, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
26 (1997).
231. See Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by
Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3, 3 (1999) (finding that constraint
satisfaction can transform ambiguous inputs into coherent decisions); Dan Simon, Daniel C.
Krawczyk & Keith J. Holyoak, Construction of Preferences by Constraint Satisfaction, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 331, 331 (2004) (demonstrating the coherence effect in nonlegal decisionmaking)
[hereinafter Simon et al., Construction of Preferences]; Dan Simon, Lien B. Pham, Quang A. Le &
Keith J. Holyoak, The Emergence of Coherence Over the Course of Decision Making, 27 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 1250, 1250 (2001) (finding that a
coherence-generating mechanism operates in a variety of processing tasks which includes
decisionmaking); Dan Simon, Chadwick J. Snow & Stephen J. Read, The Redux of Cognitive
Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 814, 814 (2004) (observing the coherence effect in the integration of evidence)
[hereinafter Simon et al., The Redux]; Dan Simon, Daniel C. Krawczyk, Airom Bleicher & Keith
J. Holyoak, The Transience of Constructed Preferences, 21 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 1 (2008)
(examining the stability of constructed preferences over time). For a review, see Dan Simon, A
Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
511 (2004) [hereinafter Simon, A Third View].
[Vol. 64:1:143196
2011] LIMITED DIAGNOSTICITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
to sway the verdict, especially when the decisionmaker is inclined
towards voting to convict. First, the spreading apart of the evidence
entails a substantial relegation of one subset of evidence items,
namely, the evidence that is inconsistent with the emerging verdict.
232
When a juror leans towards conviction, the relegation of inconsistent
evidence will amount to a reduction in the strength of the exculpating
evidence, which might otherwise have given rise to a reasonable
doubt. In other words, the coherence effect can turn a reasonable
doubt into a negligible one. Second, the coherence effect results also in
high levels of confidence, even when the evidence itself was initially
ambiguous and complex.233 Confidence levels have been found to be
correlated with the magnitude of the coherence shifts: the greater the
spreading apart of the evidence, the higher the confidence. 234 It is not
hard to see how this can undermine the effect of the heightened
standard of proof: confidence inflation can boost a mere leaning
towards conviction up to a highly confident judgment of guilt that
surpasses the requisite threshold for conviction.
235
A second important feature of this cognitive phenomenon is the
non-independence of evidence items. In principle, the probativeness of
each evidence item ought to be based on its inherent value, and not to
be influenced by other factors on which it is not logically dependent.
Inferences are deemed to proceed exclusively unidirectionally, from
evidence to verdicts. The research, however, demonstrates that the
evidence items become intertwined with the larger task through
bidirectional links to form a Gestaltian structure. As a result, the
evaluation of the evidence shifts towards a state of coherence with the
larger scheme of things.
The non-independence of evidence is manifested most clearly
by studies that show that evidence can be distorted by means of
backward reasoning, from the outcome back to the evidence.
232. Simon et al., The Redux, supra note 231, at 814; Andreas Glckner & Christoph Engel,
Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of Proof and the Probative Value of Evidence in
Coherence Based Reasoning 12, 17-19 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods,
Preprint No. 2008/36) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1307580.
233. In the experiments simulating a criminal case, more than half of the confidence ratings
were eight or above and only fifteen percent were under six (on a scale of one to eleven). Simon et
al., The Redux, supra note 231, at 819. In another study, three-quarters of the participants rated
their confidence at a level or four or five, on a scale one to five. Holyoak & Simon, supra note 231,
at 6.
234. See Simon et al., The Redux, supra note 231, at 821.
235. This shift has no such effect on the verdict when the juror is leaning towards acquittal.
Given the heightened standard of proof in criminal trials, a juror who is inclined to acquit must
do so regardless of the strength of that leaning.
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Specifically, bad outcomes lead people to interpret ambiguous
evidence as more adverse,236 and the motivation to reach a particular
outcome results in corresponding distortions of the evidence.
237
Evidence is likewise influenced by the other evidence in the case,
absent any rational connection between the items. Thus, adding a
piece of probative information can sway the decision and all other
evidence items to cohere with it.238 This nonnormative phenomenon
was observed also incidentally in a number of experiments that found
that the evidence for one side can be affected by evidence presented by
the opposing side. Studies have found that including trivial details in
one witness's testimony leads to decreases in the perceived
believability of opposing witnesses,239 disproving irrelevant details in
a witness's testimony results in increases in the credibility of opposing
witnesses, 240 and increasing the confidence of a prosecution eyewitness
leads to a weakening of the credibility of the defense alibi evidence.
241
By the same token, the coherence effect makes evidence appear
to be more consistent with other evidence items supporting the same
side. For example, simulated jurors were more likely to determine that
an ambiguous composite drawing resembled the defendant after
learning of other inculpating evidence against him,242 and discrediting
an evidence item weakened the strength of other evidence supporting
the same side.243 It should be noted that the impact of the coherence
236. Mark D. Alicke et al., A Posteriori Adjustment of A Priori Decision Criteria, 12 SOC.
COGNITION 281, 281-83 (1994).
237. The most plausible explanation for the influence on motivation on interpretations of the
evidence is that it is mediated by backward reasoning that goes through the verdict. See Dan
Simon, Douglas Stenstrom & Stephen J. Read, On the Objectivity of Investigations: An
Experiment, (CELS 2008 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2008).
238. For the effect of adding one piece of evidence on all the other evidence, see Holyoak &
Simon, supra note 231, at 11-20; Simon et al., Construction of Preferences, supra note 231, at
331-33; Simon et al., The Redux, supra note 231, at 817-22, 824-27.
239. Bell & Loftus, Degree of Detail, supra note 75, at 1171; Bell & Loftus, Vivid Persuasion,
supra note 75, at 659.
240. Jeffrey J. Borckardt et al., Effects of the Inclusion and Refutation of Peripheral Details
on Eyewitness Credibility, 33 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2187, 2187 (2003).
241. Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49,
49, 54, 61 (1996); see also Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., When Negative Evidence Increases
Confidence: Change in Belief After Hearing Two Sides of a Dispute, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 1, 1 (2002) (finding that a case judged to weakly support one side often increased
confidence in the other).
242. Steve D. Charman et al., Exploring the Diagnostic Utility of Facial Composites: Beliefs
of Guilt Can Bias Perceived Similarity Between Composite and Suspect, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 76, 84-85 (2009).
243. David A. Lagnado & Nigel Harvey, The Impact of Discredited Evidence, 15
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1166, 1166 (2008).
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effect is not limited to the decisionmaking phase. It can also result in
distortions of the witnesses' perception of the criminal event and the
investigators' conclusions.
244
The non-independence phenomenon contributes to our
understanding of the contaminating effect of extra-evidential
information, such as pretrial publicity and innuendo. The effect of
adding one piece of information to all other evidence items was
observed incidentally in a number of studies. Informing jurors that the
defendant in a murder trial was a friendless bully resulted in more
inculpatory interpretations of the testimony of the patrol officer, the
coroner, the victim's father, and the social worker. 245 Informing jurors
of a wiretapped conversation of the defendant incriminating himself
led to more inculpatory interpretations of testimony from the other
witnesses. 246 Similar effects were observed when jurors were exposed
to the defendant's prior criminal record.247 The coherence effect might
also help explain why judicial admonitions to disregard extra-
evidential information are oftentimes futile. Even if people could obey
instructions to disregard the information-in itself a difficult feat
24 8-
the biasing effect of the exposure on the other, legitimate evidence
items is bound to be harder to reverse.
244. For example, eyewitnesses' recognition of the perpetrator at a lineup decisions were
strongly influenced by exposure to information that the suspect had confessed to the crime. Lisa
E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can Confessions
Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 122, 122 (2009). Likewise, eyewitnesses'
evaluations of the similarity of facial composites to the perpetrator were affected by the strength
of the defendant's alibi. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett et al., Evaluation of Facial Composite Evidence
Depends on the Presence of Other Case Factors, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 279, 279
(2008).
245. Hope et al., supra note 202, at 111, 113. For another study showing the effect of
inadmissible pretrial publicity on juror verdicts, see Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of
Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 453 (1994).
246. Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to
Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1046 (1997).
247. Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision
Making, 19 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 67, 67 (1995); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of
the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 242
(1976). Exposing jurors to incriminating pretrial publicity in a murder trial also led them to rate
the prosecutor more favorably and the defense attorney more negatively, while exposure to
publicity that was favorable to the defendant resulted in opposite assessments. Ruva & McEvoy,
supra note 203, at 230, 231.
248. Jonathan M. Golding & Debra L. Long, There's More to Intentional Forgetting than
Directed Forgetting: An Integrative Review, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY





The research discussed in the previous two parts exposed
problems with the adjudicative process's diagnosticity. Part I revealed
that factfinders are likely to encounter considerable difficulties in
deciphering the types of testimony typically presented in criminal
trials. People are prone to overbelieve eyewitness identifications, are
not adequately sensitive to the factors that hinder identifications, and
place too much trust in the witnesses' frequently miscalibrated
confidence. Assessments of people's memories for events tend to rely
on cues that are only weakly diagnostic of accuracy. Reliance on poorly
diagnostic cues also plagues assessments of the validity of suspects'
confessions. Alibi evidence can often be misleading, as even for
innocent suspects, alibis are difficult to produce, often incorrect, hard
to corroborate, and readily disbelieved. The research finds also that
the widespread practice of attempting to judge the truthfulness of
testimony from the witness's demeanor is largely baseless. To
complicate matters, the apparent corroboration within large sets of
evidence might be no more than an artifact of the process by which
evidence is accumulated in the investigatory phase. The factfinding
task is crippled also by the paucity of the investigative record, which
deprives factfinders of information that could help assess the
reliability of the testimony. Furthermore, factfinders are provided only
with synthesized testimony, which is the product of memories that
have decayed and likely also been contaminated over the course of the
investigation and the pretrial process. The evidence has typically
undergone editing, embellishment, and alterations, and has been
gutted of traces of accuracy.
Part II examined non-evidential features of the criminal
decisionmaking process that have the potential to interfere with the
factfinding task. Human judgment is susceptible to various forms of
courtroom advocacy, including compelling narrative structures and
superficial forms of persuasion. Jurors' judgment can be swayed by
information that is inadmissible as evidence but was nonetheless
communicated to the jurors, by the emotional arousal that follows
exposure to heinous evidence, and by prejudice pertaining to the race
of the defendant or the victim. Finally, the evaluation of evidence can
be distorted by the cognitive process itself, namely, the coherence
effect. Overall, the limited diagnosticity of the process is exacerbated
by the fact that people tend to overestimate their performance on the
200 [Vol. 64:1:143
2011] LIMITED DIAGNOSTICITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS 201
tasks discussed in Part I, and to underestimate their susceptibility to
the threats discussed in Part II.
These findings call into question two claims that proponents
draw from research data in defense of the process. Proponents point to
the well-established finding that judges and juries tend to agree on
verdicts in about three-quarters of the cases.249 While this agreement
is germane to the debate comparing the performance of juries and
judges, it hardly speaks to the actual diagnosticity of either one. The
research gives reason to believe that when faced with the same trial
evidence, judges and jurors will encounter similar difficulties in
discerning the facts and will thus produce similar verdict patterns.
Proponents also stress that the strength of the evidence plays a
major role in determining verdicts. That claim too is supported by the
experimental research, 250 as well as by field data.251 The fact that the
correlations between the inculpating evidence and conviction rates are
statistically significant is indeed encouraging. Yet, their strength
gives reason for pause. In contexts where there is no reason to expect
any relationship between two variables-say, between eating broccoli
and academic performance-even a weak correlation would be
considered a promising finding. The same cannot be said for contexts
249. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 5, at 153 (1999) (noting that "in the large majority of
situations the judge and the jury reach the same conclusion"); VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5, at
148-51 (examining recent research to support judge-jury agreement on verdicts); Richard
Lempert, Why Do Juries Get a Bum Rap? Reflections on the Work of Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 453, 454 (1998) (examining Hans's work on judge-jury agreement on verdicts). This
assertion is well documented. The rate of agreement was seventy-eight percent in the classic
study reported in KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 174, at 57. A similar rate of seventy-five percent
was observed in the study conducted by the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") that
examined more than 300 felony trials in four large metropolitan areas. See Theodore Eisenberg
et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel's The
American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 177, 180 (2005).
250. See, e.g., SAUL KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE
AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 83-91 (1985); Leticia De La Fuente et al., Effects of Pretrial Juror Bias,
Strength of Evidence and Deliberation Process on Juror Decisions: New Validity Evidence of the
Juror Bias Scale Scores, 9 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 197, 197 (2003) (finding that evidential issues
and bias can successfully predict verdicts); Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The
Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (1987) (finding that juror decisions are
dominated by evidential issues).
251. The NCSC study found beta values of about 0.4 between juror verdicts and the
assessments of the strength of the prosecution's evidence. Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First
Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 381, 396 (2004). These relationships
refer to the strength of evidence as reported by the judges who sat on the cases. A study of 179
criminal jury trials conducted in Indianapolis found correlations ranging from 0.4-0.6. In this
study, the strength of evidence was based on combined estimates from prosecutors, defense
attorneys and judges. Devine et al., supra note 198, at 141, 142, 145. More data on this
relationship would be most welcome.
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where a powerful relationship is prescribed and expected in the first
place. Given the adjudicative process's steadfast commitment to
reliance on trial evidence and its commitment to high rates of
accuracy, it is troubling to find that half or more of the variance in
verdicts cannot be explained by the strength of the evidence. 252 There
is reason to suspect that the unexplainable variance can be attributed
at least in part to the factors discussed in Part II above.
253
One possible objection to this critique is that much of the
research cited in this Article is confined to human performance in de-
contextualized circumstances that fail to capture the potential for
accuracy afforded by the legal procedure. Criminal factfinding might
prove to be more diagnostic once embedded in the safeguards designed
to correct for error and bias. These include cross-examination, jury
instructions, jurors' assurances of impartiality, the prosecution's
heightened burdens, jury deliberation, and judicial review by
appellate and postconviction proceedings. A thorough discussion of
this objection extends beyond the scope of this Article. Elsewhere, I
analyze the research pertaining to the effectiveness of these
safeguards and find that they bear mixed and weak effects. To a
limited extent, the measures do improve the performance of the
process, but, under a wide range of circumstances, they are ineffective
and can even be detrimental to its diagnosticity.
254
In sum, criminal verdicts are determined to a large degree at
the investigative phase, with the trial serving primarily as a ritual
252. As mentioned, the NCSC study found beta values of about 0.4 between juror verdicts
and the assessments of the strength of the evidence. Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First Votes
in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 381, 396 (2004). In the Indianapolis study,
only thirty percent of the variance was explained by the strength of the evidence (Nagelkerke R2
= 0.30). Devine et al., supra note 198, at 143. The relationship between the actual strength of the
evidence and the verdicts in the above-mentioned field studies might have been even weaker
than these data suggest. As discussed above, the "coherence effect" likely inflated the reported
relationship by shifting the perception of the evidence to greater coherence with the verdict. See
supra note 231 and accompanying text.
One might correctly contend that the relationship between the strength of evidence and
verdict need not be linear, as the high standard of proof should result in a step function, with all
cases that fall below the standard of proof resulting in acquittals and all cases above that level
resulting in convictions. As indicated in the following footnote, this possibility is not borne out by
the field data.
253. It is also troubling to find that both judges and jurors tend to vote to convict even when
they deem the inculpatory evidence to be less than compelling. The NCSC study indicates that
both jurors and judges displayed a similar tendency of over-convicting defendants relative to
their own estimation of the strength of the prosecution's evidence. A majority of decisions in
cases with medium-strength evidence resulted in convictions, as did about one in five cases with
weak evidence. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 249, at 171, 186-87.
254. See SIMON, supra note 9, ch. 7.
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that delivers more symbolic than real value. 255 Given the widespread
trust placed in its verdicts, 256 the trial can be characterized as pseudo-
diagnostic.
257
The remainder of this Article deals with enhancing the
diagnosticity of the criminal justice process. 258 First, however, it is
imperative to examine two interrelated conceptual issues that serve to
maintain criminal adjudication in its current form despite its limited
diagnosticity: the relegation of factual accuracy and the denial of the
process's shortcomings. The prospects of reform are to a large extent
contingent on the prospects of altering these mindsets. Finally, I
suggest practical measures that have the potential to improve the
performance of the process.
255. Given the historical development of the common law's criminal justice process, its
limited accuracy is not altogether surprising. As described by John Langbein, the English
criminal process evolved piecemeal, as a series of ad hoc tactical measures intended to balance
out the advantages of the opposing adversaries and to circumvent the disbursement of
punishments that were discordant with the prevailing public sentiment. These historical
developments transpired with little concern over the system's capacity or propensity to ascertain
truth. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 306-36 (2003).
256. High expectations of accuracy were expressed in the Jurors' Beliefs Survey, which
surveyed 650 respondents. The median acceptable rate of wrongful convictions was two out of
1,000 convictions, and the mode response was zero. Simon et al., supra note 46. A survey of police
chiefs, prosecutors, and judges in Ohio found that more than three quarters maintained that the
acceptable level ought to be below 0.5%. Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction:
Perceptions of Criminal Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction
and the Extent of System Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 454 (2007). Michigan law enforcement
officials were more stringent, with two thirds stating levels of zero. Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith
& Angie Kiger, Officials' Estimates of the Incidence of "Actual Innocence" Convictions, 25 JUST. Q.
72, 87-88. A somewhat higher tolerance of error was obtained in a survey by Arkes and Mellers
of 133 college students. These respondents reported an acceptable rate of wrongful convictions of
five percent. Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 625, 631 (2002).
257. Juror decisionmaking was described by an early observer as "the great procedural
opiate." Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 262 (1920).
258. The costs of wrongful acquittals are well known: the failure to punish a truly guilty
person thwarts society's interests in retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
value expression. There are also strong reasons for reducing the incidence of wrongful
convictions to the lowest feasible level. Foremost, inflicting punishment on the innocent
constitutes a moral transgression on that person, his family, and his social circle. Preventing
wrongful convictions also serves a public-safety interest, in that every conviction of an innocent
person effectively averts the pursuit and incapacitation of the true perpetrator. Of the first 250
people exonerated by DNA, forty-two percent of the exonerations resulted in the identification of
the true perpetrator. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 7.
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B. The Relegation of Factual Accuracy
One of the most complicated and underappreciated features of
the criminal justice process is the low value it assigns to the accuracy
of its factual determinations-or, in legal parlance, the finding of
truth. It would be naive to suggest that determining facts-namely,
who committed which crime-is the single desideratum of the criminal
justice system. The process must fulfill a broader array of objectives,
which include promoting the public's acceptance of verdicts,
expressing society's values, asserting the authoritative power of the
state, bringing closure to victims, and finalizing disputes.2 59 The
process must also comport with a number of constraints, such as
expedience, cost-effectiveness, and timeliness, all the while protecting
the privacy and autonomy interests of the people involved. A key
challenge facing any criminal justice system is how to balance
between and among the search for truth and these competing
objectives and constraints.
260
The framework that has been adopted by the U.S. criminal
legal system to resolve these tensions centers on the preeminence of
procedure. Notwithstanding occasional pronouncements of the
importance of finding the truth,261 that goal is effectively eclipsed by
the prescribed procedural regime. This subversion of ends by means is
punctuated by the fact that defendants are promised certain
constitutional protections and procedural rights, not accurate
outcomes. 262 The legal regime is preoccupied with regulating issues
259. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 99 (exploring the role of juries in a democratic
system); MICHEL FOUCAULT, ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 23-25 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1994)
(explaining the purpose of a punitive society); VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5, at 65 (exploring the
role of juries in a democratic system); Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1391 (1985) (discussing the
objectives of adjudication).
260. As noted by Mirjan Damagka, the place of factual truth is contingent on the overall
nature and objectives of the respective legal regime. MIRJAN R. DAMAKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE
AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 119-30 (1985).
261. E.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 334, 344 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusing to
apply plurality's rule, arguing that it has insufficient truth-seeking functions); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986) (affirming that the purpose of constitutional standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that impairs the truth-
finding function).
262. See 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2 (3d ed. 2007); DAMA9KA, supra
note 260, at 222. For example, in discussing the admissibility of confession evidence, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained: "The inquiry made by a court concerned with these matters is not
whether the proponent of the evidence wins or loses his case on the merits, but whether the
evidentiary Rules have been satisfied." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
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such as search and seizure, confrontation of witnesses, self-
incrimination, legal representation, the right to a jury trial, and jury
selection-all of which bear nonobvious and even negative effects on
the accuracy of the verdicts. 263 The preeminence of procedural rights is
epitomized in Herbert Packer's influential Two Models of the Criminal
Process. Notably, the pro-defendant Due Process Model is concerned
primarily with protecting the defendant's right to a fair procedure.
264
To a large extent, the procedures themselves have become the
ultimate value of the process, 265 with fairness serving as its guiding
principle. Yet, fairness is not deemed to stand for the substantive
principle that people ought to get what they deserve. Rather, it serves
as a mechanical device for balancing out the litigants' perceived
advantages in the adversarial contest. The process is deemed fair if
the playing field is roughly level, 266 with little regard to what actually
transpires on it.267
The relegation of factual accuracy manifests itself throughout
the criminal justice process. Investigative procedures vary
263. To be sure, in reality defendants are not always awarded the prescribed procedures in
full. The Court often reminds us that "[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (discussing the harmless-error doctrine in such circumstances). Thus, even
when reviewing courts find procedural violations, they are often reluctant to overturn the
convictions. Judges are becoming increasingly inclined to declare procedural errors "harmless,"
thus averting a disruption of lower courts' decisions. Harmlessness is typically determined by
examining the totality of the evidence, which reverts the analysis to the trial court findings. See,
e.g., Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991) (discussing the harmless-error
doctrine); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S at 619 (same). This inquiry can be distorted by the false
corroboration discussed above, as well as by the "coherence effect" on judges' own views of the
case. See Simon, A Third View, supra note 231, at 575-83.
264. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 163-71 (1968).
265. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT,
AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 142-51 (2003) (noting the importance of
procedural justice); GEORGE C. THOMAS, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 139 (2008) (discussing the value of
procedural justice); William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997) (proposing that criminal justice is too dependent
upon procedural, and not substantive, safeguards).
266. See RICHARD H. UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD: IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? 9
(1999) (discussing the limits of parity and the concept of the level playing field).
267. For example, in the case of Jeffrey Deskovic, convicted for raping and murdering a high
school classmate, the judge explained: 'Maybe you're innocent . . . but the jury has spoken."
Fernanda Santos, Vindicated by DNA, but a Lost Man on the Outside, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11 /25/us/25jeffrey.html?pagewanted=l&_r
=
1&hp. Deskovic was exonerated by a DNA test after having served fifteen years of a possible life
sentence. Jeff Deskovic, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/44.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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considerably among law enforcement departments, are conducted with
little regard to scientific research, and often fall short of best-
practices. 268 Commonly used forensic sciences lack a verifiable
scientific basis, and are often misused and misrepresented in court.269
The place of accuracy is especially obscure and perplexing at the
pinnacle of the process-the jury's decisionmaking. Jurors are
required only to issue a general verdict, 270 are not expected to provide
any reasons, and are generally unaccountable for their decisions.
271
Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) shrouds the deliberation
process with a veil of secrecy by barring jurors from testifying about
how the decision was reached and what transpired in the deliberation
room. 272 Yet the system reserves the factfinding task exclusively to the
proverbial province of the jury and guards that dominion jealously.
273
268. See SIMON, supra note 9; Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 173, 187 (2008) (arguing that unreliable police investigations contribute to the
production of false convictions).
269. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 84-89 (2009) (discussing unreliability of forensic testing
and prosecutorial misuse of forensic evidence at trial); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLY &
L. 439, 441 (1997) ("[A]lthough scientific evidence is far superior to other types of evidence ... it
is also subject to abuse."); D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A
Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15-19),
available at http://ssrncom/abstract=1537038 (concluding that courts and defense attorneys
must do more to ensure the prosecution does not misuse and misrepresent suspect forensic
evidence).
270. Research suggests that separate voting on each element of the charge would increase
the accuracy of verdicts. Studies find a higher variance in holistic judgments than in judgments
that are disaggregated into the task's constitutive elements. Hal. R. Arkes et al., Assessing the
Merits and Faults of Holistic and Disaggregated Judgments, 23 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 250,
264 (2009); Hal R. Arkes et al., Comparing Holistic and Disaggregated Ratings in the Evaluation
of Scientific Presentations, J. BERAV. DECISION MAKING, 429, 436-37 (2006).
271. The research indicates that the lack of accountability results in less critical and more
superficial patterns of thinking. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 632, 638-40 (1989); Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment
and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 451, 457
(2002) ("Self-critical thinkers are more cautious about drawing conclusions from incomplete
evidence and are more willing to change their minds in response to evidence.").
272. The Court has upheld an order refusing an evidentiary hearing to explore jurors'
allegations that fellow jurors had consumed large amounts alcohol, marijuana and cocaine
during lunch breaks, causing them to sleep through trial sessions. Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107, 127 (1987).
273. The Court recently stated "[t]he Federal Constitution's jury-trial guarantee assigns the
determination of certain facts to the jury's exclusive province." Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 716
(2009). The Court has stated that it is decidedly "the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). As the Supreme
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Following the trial, convicted defendants face substantial
barriers to obtaining meaningful appellate and collateral review of
trial court verdicts. Access to reviewing courts is limited by intricate
statutory and judicially created procedural conditions, including filing
deadlines, contemporaneous objection at trial, narrow categories of
cognizable claims, and exhaustion of claims.27 4 Reviewing courts
generally refrain from conducting evidentiary hearings and impose
stringent thresholds for intervention. 275 Finally, cases with lingering
doubts are often punted to the executive branch,276 for whom the
political costs of freeing convicted inmates-even ones who are most
likely innocent-is particularly high.
277
The relegation of factual accuracy and low regard for claims of
innocence are most jarring in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,
which not only forges the law, but also fosters the ethos that envelopes
the system. Most bewildering is that the Court has yet to resolve its
doubts whether the Constitution affords a freestanding claim of actual
innocence to capital defendants who can provide a "truly persuasive"
demonstration of innocence. 278 Justice Scalia recently reminded us
that "[t]his Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but
is later able to convince a habeas court that he is 'actually'
innocent." 279 Even if the Court were to recognize such a right, it would
Court conceives its role, once "a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no
more." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas
explained that "neither the Court of Appeals nor we may review" a jury's factual findings. 505
U.S. 277, 296 (1992).
274. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266 (2008); RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005).
275. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). As the Supreme Court conceives its
role, once "the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more." Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) (describing the very
stringent standard for granting habeas corpus relief for issues that were "adjudicated on the
merits in state court proceedings").
276. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993) ("Clemency is deeply rooted in our
Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice
where judicial process has been exhausted.").
277. For examples, see the case of Earl Washington, Earl Washington, The Innocence
Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/EarlWashington.php (last visited Jan. 3,
2011), and the case of the "Norfolk Four", TOM WELLS & RICHARD LEO, THE WRONG GUYS:
MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).
278. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (assuming without deciding that "a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution
of a defendant unconstitutional"). The Court added that if this "assumed right" were recognized,
the threshold for establishing it would necessarily be "extraordinarily high." Id.
279. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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likely not be made available to noncapital defendants, many of whom
spend decades or their entire lives in prison.
The Court has placed defendants at an informational
disadvantage by providing them with a limited right to prosecutorial
disclosure of potentially exculpating evidence. 280 Oddly, criminal
defendants are entitled to considerably less information about the
evidence poised to deprive them of their liberty than are litigants in
simple contract or tort proceedings. 28' The right to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence is even weaker in the widespread domain of plea
negotiations. 28 2 As a result, the majority of felony convictions follow
agreements that are often based on stark information asymmetries.
Further, the Court has denied convicted inmates access to the state's
evidence to conduct DNA testing for the purpose of substantiating a
claim of innocence.
283
The Court has condoned the admission of evidence of
questionable reliability, in particular suggestive identification
procedures and dubious confessions. 28 4 This approach is intertwined
with a relegation of the significance of evidence, as manifested in the
important decision of Manson v. Brathwaite:
It is part of our adversary system that we accept at trial much evidence that has strong
elements of untrustworthiness . . . . While identification testimony is significant
280. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963); Bennett Gershman, Reflections on
Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2006) ("Reflecting on this landmark decision
forty-three years later, one is struck by the dissonance between Brady's grand expectations to
civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely unfulfilled promise."); Scott E.
Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 (2002) ("In other words, if anyone else has shared the belief that
Brady sets forth an important constitutional right for discovering exculpatory evidence prior to
trial, it is time that we re-examine Brady and realize that its superhero powers are far more
limited.").
281. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 713
(2006).
282. The Court has found that prior to entering into a plea agreement, the prosecution has
no constitutional obligation to disclose any impeachment evidence that would weaken the case
against the defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
283. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2310 (2009).
284. Suspicious identifications were admitted in the cases of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
200 (1972), and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977). For a discussion, see SIMON,
supra note 9, ch. 7; Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification
Procedures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years
Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009). For questionable confession evidence, see Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), and Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). See also George E.
Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX.
L. REV. 231 (1988).
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evidence, such testimony is still only evidence, and, unlike the presence of counsel, is not
a factor that goes to the very heart-the 'integrity'-of the adversary process.
2 8 5
The Court's low concern for the prospect of factual innocence
seeps through the values that inform its decisions. For example, in the
Herrera opinion, the Court expressed its concern over "the very
disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would
have on the need for finality in capital cases. ' 28 6 In permitting an
eyewitness identification that was obtained from a suggestive lineup,
the Court described the exclusion of the identification as a "Draconian
sanction" to the prosecution, while making light of the risk that a
misidentification posed to the defendant.28 7 In denying the right to
disclosure of exculpatory impeachment evidence during plea
negotiations, the Court stated that such a constitutional obligation
could "seriously interfere with the Government's interest in securing
those guilty pleas ... and the efficient administration of justice. '288 In
denying an evidentiary hearing to investigate allegations that
members of a jury consumed large amounts of alcohol and drugs
during a trial, the Court prioritized the interests of finality, frank
deliberation (ignoring the risk of excessive frankness), and, oddly, the
public's trust in the system.
28 9
The Court's attitude towards the value of factual accuracy is
likely to foster a sense of skepticism among detectives, lawyers, and
even judges, whose incentives are not always aligned with truth
seeking in the first place. As proponents are quick to explain, the trial
is not concerned with what actually happened at the crime scene, but
with what can be proved in court. In the practitioners' universe, the
currency of testimony is measured not by its correspondence with the
truth, but by the muscle it provides in the adversarial contest. A
positive identification by a confident eyewitness, for example, is a
powerful prosecutorial weapon, regardless of any doubts about its
accuracy or the source of its accompanying confidence. This
atmosphere of evidence-skepticism is particularly corrosive in
adversarial contexts.290 There is reason to believe that the skepticism
285. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348
(1981).
286. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
287. Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977).
288. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
289. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987).
290. Research shows that in adversarial contexts, the parties' biases are mutually
exacerbated by their perception that their opponents are biased, with the result of an escalation
209
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also affects juror decisionmaking. On occasion, juries appear to doubt
seemingly reliable and compelling evidence and thus arrive at
questionable acquittals. 291
Not surprisingly, the Court's attitude also infuses the scholarly
debate and legal pedagogy. Constitutional procedural rights dominate
the content of leading American criminal procedure casebooks, with
only a small fraction of the curriculum devoted to the question of
accuracy. Notably, a substantial share of criminal procedure education
and discourse focuses on the search and seizure doctrine which, by its
nature, thwarts accuracy and works mostly to benefit guilty
defendants. 292
C. The Denial of Error
It is noteworthy that despite the pervasive relegation of the
correct determination of facts, proponents of the criminal justice
process swear by the accuracy of its outcomes.29 3 Proponents seem to
believe in a convenient confluence, by which adherence to the
procedural safeguards leads to factually correct outcomes. 294 As noted
by an English jurist, the jury's "verdict does pass for truth."295 Justice
of the conflict. Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions
of Bias and the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 833 (2008).
291. In some instances, this skepticism appears to be shared by jurors, which could explain
the cases where juries voted to acquit defendants in the face of compelling evidence of guilt. See,
e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, After 'One Angry Woman, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 179-95 (examining race
and acquittal rates); H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case Studies of Jury
Misgivings and the Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CRIM. L.F. 1, 1-43 (1990) (describing two
situations where the jury acquitted despite strong evidence of guilt).
292. See generally WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL
TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT (1998).
293. On occasion, the Court utters fleeting and abstract admissions that the system cannot
be perfect. E.g., Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) ("[The criminal
justice] system, like any human endeavor, cannot be perfect."). This truism, however, rarely
affects the manner in which cases are adjudicated.
294. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutional Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 59-64
(1998); Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 39-43 (Harold J.
Berman ed., 1961). For a disparaging view of this approach, see FRANK, supra note 10, at 80-85;
LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 18-19 (1977). The Court all but admits that it has no
choice but to believe in the integrity of the process: "[Tihe proper evaluation of evidence under
the instructions of the trial judge is the very task our system must assume juries can perform."
Watkins v. Sauders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981).
295. R. v. William Russell (Trial of William Lord Russell), (1683) 9 St. Tr. 577 (K.B.) 666; see
also LANGBEIN, supra note 255, at 332 (identifying the speaker as George Treby, the recorder of
London, sentencing Lord Russell to death for treason).
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O'Connor stated that a person cannot be legally or factually innocent
if he was awarded the constitutional protections and found guilty by a
jury of his peers. 296 This widespread faith was famously captured by
Judge Learned Hand's assurance that, while the criminal justice
system had always been "haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted," that concern was merely "an unreal dream. ' 297 The denial
of error is shared also by law enforcement officials who operate the
system on a daily basis. A majority of surveyed police chiefs,
prosecutors, and trial judges insist that mistaken verdicts never occur
or occur only at an infinitesimal rate, at least within their
jurisdictions.298
The underpinning of the Court's faith in the accuracy of the
process is its unwavering faith in the sagacious abilities of the
factfinders to discern the truth. In explaining the liberal admission of
dubious evidence, the Court recites its trust in "the good sense and
judgment of American juries," 299 and also extends that trust to cases
where the underlying evidence is itself unreliable.300 The Court has
stated, "A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that
'the jury is the lie detector.' " 301 One sitting judge has opined that
"[t]here is something almost mystical in [the jury's] collective ability to
find the truth about a case." 302 As mentioned above, prominent
scholars exhibit a similarly sanguine view of the factfinding capacity
of juries.3
03
The proclaimed trust in the performance of the process
intensifies in the face of challenges to the system's legitimacy. For
296. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
298. A survey of 798 Ohio law enforcement officials found that some thirty percent of police
chiefs and prosecutors and fifteen percent of judges believed that the incidence of wrongful
convictions in their jurisdiction was zero. A large majority (seventy-seven percent, seventy-eight
percent, and forty-six percent, respectively) believed that the incidence was less than 0.5 percent.
These officials maintained that the incidence is considerably higher elsewhere in the United
States. Ramsey & Frank, supra note 256, at 448, 452-55 (2007). Similar findings were made in a
survey of Michigan law enforcement officials. Zalman, Smith& Kiger, supra note 256, at 83-87.
299. Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
300. For illustration, in a decision to admit as evidence an eyewitness identification which
was acknowledged by the state to have been suggestive and unnecessary, the Court explains:
"Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification
testimony that has some questionable feature." Id.
301. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1997).
302. Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 664
(2007).
303. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 5, at 153; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5; Lempert, supra
note 249.
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example, in a polemical opinion in the death penalty case of Kansas v.
Marsh, Justice Scalia dismissed wrongful convictions as an
"insignificant minimum,"30 4  and stated mystifyingly that their
exposure is a testament not to the process's failure, "but its
success."30 5 The defensiveness becomes particularly pointed when the
adversarial system is compared unfavorably to the continental
inquisitorial system, with its explicit commitment to the discovery of
truth.30 6 These critiques are typically met with manifestations of legal
nationalism,3 7 consisting of a fervent defense of the American system
and counter-criticisms of the inquisitorial framework. 308 In that same
opinion, Justice Scalia lamented that the dissenters' mere mention of
the prospect of error will be "trumpeted abroad as vindication" of the
criticism of the United States' criminal justice system by
"sanctimonious" and "finger-wagg[ing]" nations, which he
subsequently identified as members of the European Union. 30 9 Rather
304. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193, 199 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a critique of
the mathematical formula that underlies this claim, see Samuel R. Gross, Souter Passant, Scalia
Rampant: Combat in the Marsh, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 69-70 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fl/105/gross.pdf.
305. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 193. In reality, a large number of exonerations have been obtained
over bitter resistance by prosecutors and even judges. For a discussion of prosecutorial
intransigence in the face of exculpating DNA evidence, see Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:
Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004).
306. For notable critiques, see generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1978);
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL (2008); WEINREB, supra note 294; Albert
W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a
Categorical Imperative? 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349 (1981); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea
Bargaining., How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978).
307. SARAH J. SUMMERS, FAIR TRIALS: THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL TRADITION
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2007). Legal nationalism also has popular
manifestations. In a 1999 survey conducted by the ABA, only thirty percent of respondents were
either extremely or very confident in the American justice system. Still, eighty percent agreed or
strongly agreed that "the American justice system is still the best in the world." AM. BAR ASS'N,
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 50, 59 (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org
/media/perceptionperceptions.pdf.
308. See Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More
Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 721-22
(1988); Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutional Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 73-75
(1998); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure,
87 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial
Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240
(1977).
309. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 187-88 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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than foster introspection, these debates appear to have entrenched the
system's aversion to acknowledging its deficiencies.
310
There is little doubt that this self-assurance in the process's
diagnosticity caters to important psychological and societal needs. For
one, people tend towards favorable assessments of the prevailing
social order, deeming it to be just and legitimate. 311 The mere notion
that the state can wreck the lives of innocent people casts a
disconcerting shadow over the integrity of the system. More
importantly, perceiving oneself as competent and fair is a ubiquitous
and powerful personal need.312 The prospect of contributing to a
wrongful conviction poses a personal threat to the psyche of the people
involved in its operation. Ironically, the prevalent response to threats
of this kind is to deny their existence. 31 3 Thus, rather than address the
weaknesses of this complex, vulnerable, and yet potentially lethal
social process, the criminal justice system comforts itself with a
palliative insistence on its infallibility. To paraphrase Justice Jackson,
the system is entrusted with dispensing the state's punitive powers
not because it is infallible; it deems itself infallible because of the
powers it possesses. 31 4
310. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1636 (2009)
(noting that the inquisitorial system was "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed" (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004))). At the same time,
critics should acknowledge that the inquisitorial system is an imperfect method of discovering
truth. See generally JACQUELINE HODOSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE (2005) (critiquing the
French criminal justice system and suggesting means of improvement).
311. On the psychological construct of "system justification," see John T. Jost & Orsolya
Hunyady, The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 13 EUR.
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 114 (2002). In this regard, system justification theory overlaps with
cognitive dissonance theory. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
312. See Barry R. Schlenker, Self-Presentation, in HANDBOOK OF SELF AND IDENTITY 492, 498
(Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney eds., 2003) ("People want others to see them as having
positive, socially desirable qualities."); cf. Cynthia McPherson Frantz, IAM Being Fair: The Bias
Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL., 157,
157 (2006); Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 781 (2004) (exploring the relationship
between the ability of individuals to detect bias in others while denying such biases in
themselves in the context of self and social perception).
313. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister et al., Freudian Defense Mechanisms and Empirical
Findings in Modern Social Psychology: Reaction Formation, Projection, Displacement, Undoing,
Isolation, Sublimation, and Denial, 66 J. PERSONALITY, 1081, 1108 (1998).
314. In Brown v. Allen, Justice Jackson explained the power of the Court: "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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D. Enhancing the Diagnosticity of the Process
The criminal justice system can no longer afford to skirt the
issue of factual guilt.315 As a normative matter, one can neither justify
nor dismiss the risk of wrongful convictions, no matter which other
competing objectives might be served by them. Convicting a person for
a crime he did not commit renders any such objective-the public's
acceptance of the verdict, the assertion of the state's authority, and
the expression of society's values-a vacuous, even cynical, exercise of
power. Before being subjected to the state's punitive powers, people
deserve more than procedural rights; they deserve to be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt by a system that is deeply committed to
getting the facts right. In the majority of criminal cases, verdicts
consist of little more than factual determinations and as such, they
are essentially extrapolations from the evidence presented at trial.
Thus, the criminal justice system must abandon the view that
evidence "is still only evidence," 316 which can be readily subsumed to
competing considerations. While the Court is correct in stating that
evidence does not go to the heart of the adversary process, 317 it fails to
appreciate that evidence is the matter from which criminal verdicts
are made. The time is ripe for elevating factual accuracy to the
preeminent status it deserves.
It is incumbent on the criminal justice system to soften its
claim to certitude and to acknowledge the process's limitations and
susceptibility to error. Entrusting the vital task of criminal factfinding
to the "good sense and judgment of American juries" 318 is indeed an
appealing ideal. Still, one cannot ignore the limits of juries' ability to
accurately determine the facts from the hodgepodge of truths, errors,
biases, and lies presented at trial. Thus, the criminal justice process
ought to adopt a more realistic approach towards the performance of
its factfinders and find ways to make their task more manageable.
The fact that an appreciable number of wrongful convictions has
emerged from under the thick layers of finality suggests that
something troubling is brewing below the surface of proceduralism. In
315. As noted by Hannah Arendt, in judging complex social matters, the truth is "the ground
on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us." HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND
FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 259 (1977).
316. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348 (1981); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113
(1977).
317. Manson, 432 U.S. at 113.
318. Id. at 116.
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approaching the question of reform, the discourse must transcend the
habitual hyper-adversarial mindset that colors all things criminal in
shades of pro-prosecution and pro-defense. Importantly, reforms
should not be designed to reduce the rate of convictions or acquittals
across the board, but should be targeted as narrowly as possible at
wrongful convictions and acquittals.
319
A first concrete step towards improving the diagnosticity of the
process is to restrict the admissibility of evidence that is clouded by
serious doubt. Put simply, the evidence admitted at court must be
reasonably reliable. This is especially important with respect to
eyewitness identifications and confessions, two highly persuasive yet
frequently unreliable types of evidence. This goal can be achieved by
tightening the doctrines that are currently used to determine
admissibility. Eyewitness identifications borne by flawed lineup
procedures ought to be ruled inadmissible per se, and the substantive
criteria used for determining reliability should be based on scientific
evidence rather than on judicial intuitions. 320 When it comes to
admitting questionable confessions, courts should resume the
examination of their reliability rather than limit the analysis to the
question of voluntariness. These decisions should also be based on
more stringent criteria than the standard of preponderance of the
evidence that is currently used.321 In short, flawed identifications,
319. A measure intended to reduce the rate of one type of error across an entire category of
defendants will fail to address the uneven distribution of errors among the individual cases, and
thus benefit some guilty defendants but not other innocent ones. In other words, blunt attempts
to reduce false positives stand to result in a disproportionate increase in the opposite type of
error, namely, false negatives. It must be acknowledged that translating this caution into policy
is complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of truly guilty and innocent
defendants in the mix of the cases, and by the perplexing task of weighting the social costs of the
respective errors.
One must also be cognizant of the potential unintended and unwanted consequences of
reform. As noted by Carol and Jordan Steiker, the concept of actual innocence can be used as a
double edged sword, and it has been deployed successfully by the Court and by Congress to
justify policies that deprive defendants of a fair review of their cases. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence
in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 609-11 (2005).
320. For more on these recommendations and the research that underlies them, see SIMON,
supra note 9, chs. 3, 7, 8. Needless to mention, identifications should not be barred for minor
flaws in the procedure. Delineating the appropriate boundaries for exclusion is beyond the scope
of this discussion. Suffice it to say that the identifications that were the subject of the landmark
cases Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite bore the signs of unreliability and should
therefore have been excluded. It is important also the vacuous practice of in-court identifications
never be used as a cure for flawed identification procedures.
321. For more on this recommendation and the research that underlies it, see generally
Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in
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unreliable confessions, and other faulty evidence ought not to be
"customary grist for the jury mill."322
Second, when needed, factfinders should be aided by expert
testimony. As discussed above, lay people are not sufficiently familiar
with the numerous factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness
identification, memory for the event, confessions, and alibi testimony.
Instead, people tend to rely on intuitive and often incorrect cues.
323
Yet expert testimony is often unavailable, as it is deemed inadmissible
in many jurisdictions. 324 The limited research that tested the impact of
expert testimony indicates that it tends to increase juror sensitivity to
the accuracy of the evidence with few downside effects.
325
Third, jurors should be discouraged from attempting to
determine the truthfulness of the testimony from the witnesses'
demeanor. As mentioned, people generally perform poorly in detecting
deceit, with accuracy rates that barely exceed chance levels. Yet, a
juror's conclusion that a witness is deceitful is often enough to dismiss
her entire testimony, if not that party's case altogether. The danger
emanating from erroneous determinations of deceit is exacerbated by
the fact that jurors are regularly given explicit instructions to make
inferences of credibility from the witness's demeanor. Thus, jury
instructions should be revised to inform jurors about the peril of deceit
detection from demeanor and caution them against attempting to
engage in that task. While the effects of such an instruction are
unknown, it will likely do more good than harm.
Recall that the research found also that the opportunity to
observe the communicator does not contribute to the accuracy of deceit
detection. Reading a transcript of the statement or hearing an audio
recording of it has been found to be at least as accurate, and even
the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WISc. L. REV. 479; SIMON, supra note 9, chs. 5, 7, 8. For a
discussion on the courts' backing away from examination of the reliability of confessions, see Dix,
supra note 284, at 272-76.
322. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116.
323. As such, the admission of expert testimony should "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and thus meet the criterion prescribed by Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.
324. Schmechel et al., supra note 30, at 183-93.
325. This research has been confined mostly to eyewitness identification testimony. See
Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV., 311, 318-26 (1989); Jennifer L. Devenport et al., How Effective are the Cross-
Examination and Expert Testimony Safeguards? Jurors' Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and
Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1042, 1046-49 (2002). For a
review, see Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 909 (1995).
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more accurate, than viewing the communicator firsthand. This finding
suggests that appellate and postconviction judges are in no
disadvantage relative to courtroom factfinders when it comes to
assessing the veracity of the testimony. It follows that this perceived
disadvantage ought not to prevent these judges from intervening in
factual findings made by trial courts.
Finally, the most significant contribution to the diagnosticity of
the criminal trial entails intervention at the investigative process,
specifically, by enhancing the transparency of the investigatory
process. Greater transparency can be achieved by electronically
recording investigations and making the record available to all
parties. The recording should capture the investigations in their
entirety, including all lineups, interviews, and interrogations.
326
A major benefit of conducting transparent investigations is
that they are likely to produce more accurate evidence. The record will
make available the witness's original statements, which are usually
the most accurate account of the criminal event. 327 Thus, the record
will effectively freeze the witness's statements at their raw state, and
thereby minimize the effects of memory decay, contamination, and any
biases or distortions borne by the investigative and pre-trial processes.
This should bind witnesses to their original statements, and also
reduce the pressure applied on them to alter their testimony.
328
326. The recording should include all investigative efforts, even if they are not used in court,
such as interviews with witnesses whose statement do not support the prosecution. Meticulous
records should be made also of the collection of physical evidence, forensic tests, and the like.
327. On occasion, an early statement might be clouded by the immediate arousal following
the crime, or be based on a rash interpretation of the event. Still, in the vast majority of cases,
raw evidence is bound to be more complete and less contaminated than synthesized evidence.
328. Moreover, transparent investigations are expected to have an ameliorative effect on the
investigative process itself. The availability of a record would increase investigators' sense of
accountability for the way they conduct their investigations. Transparency would .help ensure
that investigators adhere to best-practices by providing law enforcement agencies with a tool for
training, oversight, and quality assurance, and by deterring police misconduct.
The creation of a record is bound also to serve an informational tool by capturing forensic
details that would otherwise be collected. The well-known RAND study of police investigations
found that many investigative records are incomplete and casually maintained. Police files
covered between twenty-six percent and forty-five percent of the evidentiary questions
considered essential by prosecutors. The authors posited that poor record-keeping resulted in
higher case dismissal rates and weakening of the prosecutors' plea bargaining position. PETER
W. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 11. Likewise, experienced Canadian police officers concede
that their note-taking habits result in case dismissals. John C. Yuille, Research and Teaching
with Police: A Canadian Example, 33 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 5, 5-23 (1984). Freeing police detectives
from unnecessary court proceedings and hostile cross examinations should also enable them to
devote more effort to solving crimes.
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The combined effects of greater accuracy and transparency of
the evidence should make a profound impact on the legal proceedings,
starting with the widespread practice of plea bargaining. As
mentioned, more than ninety percent of the people imprisoned for
felony convictions admitted to their guilt in a privately negotiated
agreement, rather than being convicted in open court. 329 One cannot
ignore the fact that defendants are forced to make fateful choices
based on sparse and uncertain evidence, which will likely never be
scrutinized. 330 Greater transparency should lead prosecutors to offer
plea deals that are more fair and justified, and enable defendants to
better assess their situation before signing off on long terms of
imprisonment. 331
More accurate and transparent testimony will undoubtedly
have an auspicious effect on the integrity of the verdicts produced at
trial. Naturally, factfinders will be in a better position to determine
the facts when presented with more accurate accounts of the criminal
event. Recent studies punctuate the benefit that can be derived from
access to the investigative record. Studies show that judgments of
eyewitness identifications are substantially improved by
supplementing the witness's testimony with the speed of her choice at
the lineup and her raw confidence. One study found that choices made
within ten seconds and accompanied by high confidence were
considerably more accurate than slow and low confidence choices
(eighty-eight versus fifty-four percent accuracy). 332 Likewise, a large
field study conducted in Germany found substantial differences
329. For critiques of the practice, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining, Part One, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1059-154 (1976); William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548-69 (2004).
But see Thomas W. Church, In Defense of Bargain Justice, Law & Society Review, 13 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 509, 509-25 (1979) (arguing that the plea bargaining system sufficiently protects
defendants' rights if certain fairness-related criteria are met). On the heightened risk that plea
bargaining poses for innocent defendants, see Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and
Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1412-
24 (2003) [hereinafter Alschuler, Straining at Gnats].
330. As mentioned, the Court has imposed only partial duties of disclosure in the context of
plea bargaining. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
331. It should be realized that in devising their plea offers, prosecutors trade off the
probability of prevailing at trial with the severity of the offered sentence. Alschuler, Straining at
Gnats, supra note 329, at 1412-13. Higher predictability is thus expected to increase the
sentences reached in plea negotiations.
332. Choices were considered confident for levels above ninety percent, and low for levels
under eighty percent. Nathan Weber et al., Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Response
Latency: The Unruly 10-12-Second Rule, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 139, 139-47
(2004).
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between witnesses who decided within six seconds and were more
than ninety percent confident, and witnesses who were slower and
less confident (ninety-seven versus thirty-two percent accurate).
333 It
has also been found that simulated jurors are more successful at
ascertaining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications when they are
shown video recordings of the initial interviews with the witnesses
and the lineups where they picked out the target. Notably, the study
revealed greater circumspection in trusting inaccurate witnesses.
3 34
Jurors' ability to decipher the evidence is likely to be enhanced
also by shedding light on the investigative procedures used to elicit
the testimony. In particular, exposure to the particulars of the
investigation should help them determine whether the testimony
might have been swayed or otherwise biased by the investigation
itself. For example, jurors will have much to gain from learning
whether explicit or implicit suggestions were made at the lineup,
leading questions were asked at the interview, witnesses experienced
pressures to respond in any particular manner, or coercive techniques
were deployed in the interrogation room. Statements borne by such
procedures would be treated with circumspection, while testimony
obtained by sound procedures would command higher regard. 335 More
accurate and transparent testimony is expected also to markedly
improve the manner in which criminal trials are conducted. Greater
confidence in the integrity of the evidence should reduce the distrust
between the adversarial parties and soften the contentiousness of the
process. The range of plausible claims will be curbed, with the effect of
narrowing the opportunities for unjust prosecutions and frivolous
333. It should be noted that about one-third of the witnesses could not be classified into
either of these categories. Melanie Sauerland & Siegfried L. Sporer, Fast and Confident:
Postdicting Eyewitness Identification Accuracy in a Field Study, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 46, 46-62 (2009).
334. Exposing the simulated jurors to the videotapes of inaccurate witnesses reduced the
conviction rate from forty-nine percent to thirty-three percent. The rate was hardly affected
when the witnesses were accurate (fifty percent versus forty-six percent). Margaret C. Reardon &
Ronald P. Fisher, Effect of Viewing the Interview and Identification Process on Juror Perceptions
of Eyewitness Accuracy, APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. (forthcoming).
335. It must be acknowledged that the creation of the electronic record itself can introduce
bias. Factors such as camera perspective, framing, lighting and editing can shape the narrative
impact of the film. For example, research on taping interrogations has found that focusing the
video camera exclusively on the suspect inflates the perceived voluntariness of the suspect's
statements, which results in unwarranted trust in coerced confessions. G. Daniel Lassiter et al.,
Evidence of the Camera Perspective Bias in Authentic Videotaped Interrogations: Implications for
Emerging Reform in the Criminal Justice System, 14 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 157-70 (2009);
G.D. Lassiter et al., Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye of the Camera?, in 33 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (M.P. Zanna ed., 2001).
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defenses. Prosecutors would be in a position to pursue strong cases
more forcefully, and defense attorneys would be better equipped to
defend innocent defendants and to pursue valid claims of their clients.
The incidence of swearing contests between defendants and detectives
is likely to decrease, thus averting the need to sort out the murky facts
through the costly, cumbersome, and imprecise process of litigation.33
6
In sum, both plea negotiations and trials stand to become more
accurate, focused, and less contentious, resulting in fewer appeals,
habeas proceedings, civil suits, and damage payouts.
To be sure, the recommendation to create investigative records
is bound to be met with resistance from some law enforcement
agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, has
steadfastly resisted taping custodial interrogations of crime suspects.
The Bureau expressed concerns over disclosure of investigative
methods, heightened risks for witnesses, prohibitive monetary costs,
and the suppression of confessions due to failures to record.33 7 These
concerns, however, have been largely dispelled by the experience of
numerous law enforcement agencies in the handful of states and
scores of counties where the practice is currently mandated. The
consistent reaction of police personnel and prosecutors in these
jurisdictions is nothing short of enthusiastic support. Transparency
has turned out to be a beneficial tool in the hands of law enforcement,
even as it continues to receive backing from defense attorneys.338 As
stated by a Minnesota law enforcement official, the order by the state
Supreme Court to tape interrogations was "the best thing we've ever
had rammed down our throats."339 A survey of 630 active police
investigators found that eighty-one percent of the respondents
believed that interrogations ought to be recorded in full.340 Cost and
logistics are hardly a reason to thwart this initiative. Recording
336. Freeing police detectives from excessive court proceedings and hostile cross
examinations should also reduce the adversarial pressures they encounter and enable them to
devote more effort to solving crimes.
337. For an account and critique of the FBI's arguments, see generally Thomas P. Sullivan,
Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIMINAL L. REV. 45 (2008).
338. See also Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement
Officials' Failure To Record Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 221 221-22 (2009) (advocating against presumed inadmissibility of testimony
about custodial interviews).
339. Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recordings of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1127 (2005) (quoting Alan K. Harris, Hennepin County
Deputy Prosecutor).
340. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of
Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BERAV. 381, 385, 393 (2007).
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encounters with members of the public is becoming increasingly
common, as patrol cars and even individual police officers are being
equipped with electronic recording devices.
341
Critics are likely also to resist sharing investigative recordings
with the defense, which would effectively afford defendants greater
discovery than is currently mandated. A comprehensive debate about
the merit of expanded discovery is beyond the scope of this
discussion.342 It should be noted, however, that here too the resistance
to discovery is mostly conjectural and unnecessarily apprehensive. A
number of states, including Arizona, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey,
and North Carolina, have implemented liberal discovery, with no
apparent regrets. In particular, these jurisdictions have not
experienced the much feared increase in perjury and witness
intimidation.
3 43
While recording investigations is no panacea, 344 there is good
reason to believe that greater transparency-alongside improvements
341. Personal use of helmet cameras have been implemented in San Jose, California and in
the UK. See Claudia Cowan, Helmet Cams for Cops, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 3, 2009), http://
liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2009/11/03/helmet-cams-for-cops/; Alan Travis, Police to Use Helmet
Cams to Record Public Order Incidents, GUARDIAN, July 12, 2007, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/l2/humanrights.ukcrime.
342. For a discussion, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 262, § 20.1.
343. For a discussion, see THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES;
A POLICY REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/-jmiller/wp-
content/uploads/polpack-discovery-hirez-native-file.pdf. Critics might oppose this proposed
measure also on the grounds that it alters the principle of "orality," a central feature of the
Anglo-American criminal trial by which testimony is heard live, in open court. Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52 (2004). The proposition, however, should not be seen as a
challenge to the principle of orality, as the recorded testimony should supplement, rather than
replace, oral testimony. The admission of investigative records into evidence is bound to raise
various issues with the rules of evidence, notably with connection to the doctrines on hearsay
and the authentication of evidence. A full discussion of these issues is beyond the boundaries of
this Article. For now, suffice it to say that the proposed regime will need to be reconciled with
extant evidence law.
344. It must be acknowledged that the creation of the electronic record itself can introduce
bias. Factors such as camera perspective, framing, lighting, and editing can shape the narrative
impact of the film. For example, research on taping interrogations has found that focusing the
video camera exclusively on the suspect inflates the perceived voluntariness of the suspect's
statements, which results in unwarranted trust in coerced confessions. G. Daniel Lassiter et al.,
Evidence of the Camera Perspective Bias in Authentic Videotaped Interrogations: Implications for
Emerging Reform in the Criminal Justice System, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINALOGICAL PSYCHOL. 157,
159-60 (2009).
It is inevitable also that some investigations will go unrecorded, whether due to equipment
failure, witness noncooperation, or police misconduct. Based on the experience with taping of
custodial interrogations, there is reason to believe that the majority of investigations will be
taped, primarily because it will be in the police's best interests to do so. Sullivan & Vail, supra
note 338, at 221-22 (describing the reasons that police officers prefer to tape interrogations).
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in investigative procedures 345-should enhance the integrity of the
evidence from which criminal verdicts are made. This should make
plea negotiations and trials more accurate, focused, and less
contentious, thus resulting in fewer appellate and habeas proceedings,
civil suits, and damage payouts. This state of affairs should increase
the prospects of determining the culpability of guilty defendants and
the innocence of those who committed no crime. 346
CONCLUSION
The research discussed in this Article leads to the conclusion
that the cognitive processing involved in determining the facts in
difficult criminal cases is more complex, fickle, and vulnerable to
manipulation than is generally believed. As a result, the adjudicative
process falls short of reliably distinguishing between guilty and
innocent defendants. Thus, the process fails to deliver the level of
diagnosticity that befits its epistemic demands and the certitude it
proclaims. This shortfall is generally ignored or denied by those
entrusted with governing the criminal justice system, and is not
adequately recognized in the scholarly debate. This Article has
suggested ways to ameliorate some of the issues identified here. Still,
345. Elsewhere, I offer specific proposals to improve lineup procedures, interviews with
cooperative witnesses, interrogations of suspects, and management of the investigative process.
See SIMON, supra note 9, chs. 2-5. Although implementing reform of investigative procedures
across the numerous police departments is no easy feat, it is encouraging to note that a number
of states and jurisdictions have already made commendable progress in this regard. Notable
examples include reforms of lineup procedures that been put into effect in Wisconsin, New
Jersey, North Carolina, and various counties. Mandatory taping of interrogations is in force in
Minnesota, Alaska, Illinois and other counties. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, FIX THE SYSTEM:
PRIORITY ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/fixyPriority-Issues.php
(detailing efforts to reform eyewitness identification, false confessions, DNA testing access,
evidence preparation, forensic oversight, innocence commissions, and exoneree compensation).
346. When all else fails, mistaken convictions can be corrected at the very end of the process,
via "innocence commissions," such as those established in the UK, Norway, and the state of
North Carolina. In general terms, these quasi-judicial agencies are commissioned to review
possible wrongful convictions and refer valid cases back to the court system. See CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2008, at 8-10 (2009). On the North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1460 to 1475; N.C. INNOCENCE
INQUIRY COMM'N, http://www.innocencecommission-nc.govlindex.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2010)
(describing the work and structure of the Commission in detail). While having to drudge through
the entire criminal justice process can take a heavy toll on the life of an innocent inmate, belated
justice is far superior to injustice.
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as long as the ascertainment of factual truth will remain a human
endeavor, the accuracy of criminal verdicts will inevitably be
constrained by the imperfect human cognition that makes them
possible.

